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Dramatic technological changes often produce equally dramatic
changes in legal theory and practice. As new technology presents the
law with unanticipated problems and issues, jurists must decide
whether these developments can be accommodated within the
established legal doctrine,' whether the doctrine must be substantially
revised to incorporate them,2 or whether an entirely new branch of
* B.A., University of California, 1996; J.D., Yale Law School, 1999. The author
wishes to thank Alvin Klevorick for his encouragement and friendship. Thanks are also
due to James Boyle, Carol Rose, Theo Angelis, Max Minzner, David Kiernan, and H.
Hamang Patel.
1. For instance, a number of jurists have argued that recent changes in
communications technology do not necessitate any novel developments in First
Amendment law. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S.
727, 812-38 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is no persuasive basis for
"treating cable operators differently from other First Amendment speakers"); Thomas G.
Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment Principles for Converging
Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719 (1995) (arguing that advances in
communications technology can be addressed adequately under traditional First
Amendment doctrine). See generally Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476
U.S. 488, 496 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("In assessing First Amendment claims
concerning cable access, the Court must determine whether the characteristics of cable
television make it sufficiently analogous to another medium to warrant application of an
already existing standard or whether those characteristics require a new analysis.").
2. For example, as economic growth and advances in transportation and
communications technology have combined to expand the scope of interactions among
geographically distant individuals, courts have continuously revised the doctrine of
personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)
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doctrine is required.3 The more revolutionary the technological
change, the more likely it is to produce substantial legal
developments.4 Revolution is contagious: technological change alters
human interactions, and as these change, so must the systems that
govern them.
It should therefore come as no surprise that, as computer
technology has advanced rapidly in the past decade, the legal system
has begun to question the applicability of its traditional doctrines to
the digitized world. Courts have struggled, with varying degrees of
success, to apply legal precedents to disputes involving electronic
technology, commerce, and communication.5 These efforts have
(establishing circumstances in which a state can assert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-
state defendant); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (relaxing Due
Process limitations on state jurisdiction because the "increasing nationalization of
commerce has [produced] a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail
across state lines. At the same time, modem transportation and communication have
made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he
engages in economic activity."); Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine and Old Bottles:
Personal Jurisdiction, the Internet, and the Nature of Constitutional Evolution, 38
JURIMETRICS J. 575 (1998) (exploring doctrinal modifications in personal jurisdiction law
that have resulted from advances in electronic communication, and advocating further
modifications in the same vein); Andrew E. Costa, Comment, Minimum Contacts in
Cyberspace: A Taxonomy of the Case Law, 35 HOUs. L. REV. 453 (1998) (cataloging
various ways in which courts have responded to the new doctrinal complexities posed by
electronic communication).
3. The emergence and evolution of products liability law exemplifies this latter path.
Products liability doctrine arose in response to changes in commercial production and
distribution brought about by the Industrial Revolution, and it has continued to evolve in
response to technological progress ever since. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 727-30 (6th ed. 1995) (summarizing the doctrinal eras of
products liability law); Gary Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 601-20 (1992) (discussing how various
modernizations have spurred changes in products liability regimes).
4. Cf. Preferred Communications, Inc, 476 U.S. at 496 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(indicating that the more analogous a new technology is to an older technology, the more
likely it is to be analyzed within pre-existing legal doctrines); Robert L. Rabin, Tort Law
in Transition: Tracing the Patterns of Sociolegal Change, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 21, 32
(1988) (explaining how radical developments in tort law were driven, in part, by
revolutionary scientific and technological advances after World War II).
5. See, e.g., CompuServe v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (analyzing the
relationship between Internet commerce and the conventional "minimum contacts" test
for personal jurisdiction); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995)
(analyzing the extent to which copyright protections extend to menu command hierarchies
in spreadsheet software); Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994)
(analyzing the extent to which copyright protections extend to graphical user interfaces in
computer systems); Urofsky v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Va. 1998) (using traditional
First Amendment doctrine to invalidate a statutory restriction on Internet access); see also
Jack E. Brown, "Analytical Dissection" of Copyrighted Computer Software- Complicating
the Simple and Confounding the Complex, 25 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 801 (1993) (criticizing judicial
efforts to apply copyright law to software technology); Redish, supra note 2 (criticizing the
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produced a body of doctrine that is incomplete and at times
incoherent. In many cases, those law-and-technology issues that have
been addressed have been resolved only partially or inconclusively.
Some have been decided inconsistently across jurisdictions. And a
number of important legal issues pertaining to the development and
use of computer technology have yet to be addressed at all.
This legal uncertainty has left technological innovators in
something of a bind. With the applicability of conventional doctrine
in doubt, hardware and software developers cannot be sure of the
extent to which they may protect, promote, and reap benefits from
their innovations. What legal entitlements exist when the products
themselves cannot easily be defined?6 How do the protections of
copyright, trademark, and patent law apply in technology industries? 7
What constitutes "fair competition" in a high-tech world where
previously anomalous practices have become commonplace? 8 The
need to answer these central questions has produced a great deal of
litigation; courtroom battles have erupted as actors in emerging
technology industries have attempted to capitalize on their own
innovations or profit from those of others. This litigation has
included several recent high-profile legal disputes, most notably the
courts' application of traditional jurisdiction doctrine in CompuServe v. Patterson and
other cases); Dana R. Wagner, Case Note, The First Amendment and the Right to Hear,
108 YALE LJ. 669 (1998) (criticizing the court's application of traditional First
Amendment doctrine in Urofsky v. Allen).
6. In some segments of the software industry, for example, the proper scope of the
relevant "product" is in much dispute. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 807
(analyzing whether the arrangement of executable program instructions is copyrightable
subject matter or merely an unprotected "method of operation"); Steve Lohr, Browsers
and Borders Are Argued at the Microsoft Trial, N.Y. IMES, Jan. 20, 1999, at C8 ("[T]he
government spent most of today attacking the company's central defense-that its
Internet browsing software is a seamless feature of its Windows operating system and not
a stand-alone product. The government is trying to prove that the browser and operating
system are two products."); cf Rivals Mount New Threat to Windows, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Jan. 13, 1999, at 11 ("The joint venture is expected to centre on the fusion of Oracle's
database system... with Sun's Solaris product ... the most popular corporate operating
system. Both companies will have the right to re-sell the resulting software as a single
product."). This form of definitional difficulty is compounded by the fact that, in high
technology industries, the line between "product" and "information" is often extremely
unclear. Cf. Joseph I. Rosenbaum, New Form of Intellectual Property Emerges; Database
Protection Is Serious Issue, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 2, 1998, at S2 (exploring whether databases of
public information are and should be subject to intellectual-property protection).
7. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 803; Apple Computer, 35 F.3d at 1443.
8. See, e.g., Henry Norr, Here Come the Clones, MACUSER, Feb. 1995, at 76
("[Apple, IBM, and Motorola] agreed on a common hardware platform .... [A]nd they
proclaimed it an open standard, one other manufacturers will be free to copy in designing
their own systems."); Stephen H. Wildstrom, Freeware? What's Not to Like?, Bus. WK.,
Jan. 11, 1999, at 26 (reporting that software companies such as Sun, Netscape, IBM, and
3Com will be giving away their programs and the source codes of their programs for free).
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Microsoft litigation,9 Intergraph's lawsuit against Intel,10 and the
FTC's investigation of Dell Computer Corporation."
The parties and courts have framed these disputes under a
variety of legal paradigms, including antitrust law,12 contract law,13
and patent law.' 4 At the heart of each of these disputes, however, lies
the same fundamental issue. In all of them, the central question is
how to strike the proper balance between (a) promoting open-access
technological standards and (b) granting strong, exclusionary
property rights to technological innovators. The disputes are also
similar in that they all involve the same form of technology: the
"architectural" or "meta-" technology that controls the computing
environments within which users operate-a form of technology that
may be referred to as "systems technology." Thus, although these
disputes have arisen in different sectors of the computer industry and
have been analyzed under a variety of legal doctrines, they all reduce
to essentially the same question: In the systems-technology context,
how should the law balance the competing policies of promoting open
standards and protecting the property rights of innovators?
This Article provides one answer to that question. I will argue
that, once we recognize the common thread that connects systems-
technology disputes, we can examine them within a single analytical
framework. This framework focuses on the trade-off between open
standards and exclusionary property rights, as well as on the
relationship between antitrust doctrine and the intellectual-property
system. When we apply this framework to systems-technology
disputes and consider the features of the markets in which these
disputes occur, a common method of resolution suggests itself.
Specifically, it appears that the legal regime should protect
9. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (remedy
ruling); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (conclusions of
law); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (findings of fact);
see also Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 1998)
(granting preliminary injunction), vacated and remanded, 188 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999),
and injunction reinstated, 87 F. Supp. 2d 992 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
10. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998), vacated
and remanded, 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999), and on remand, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (N.D.
Ala. 2000).
11. See Dell Computer Corp., No. 931-0097 (F.T.C. 1996); Federal Trade Comm'n,
Dell Computer Corp.-Consent Agreement with Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 60
Fed. Reg. 57870 (1995) [hereinafter Dell Consent Agreement].
12. See Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1350; Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 35; Intergraph, 3 F.
Supp. 2d at 1255.
13. See Sun Microsystems, 87 F. Supp. 2d 992; see also Sun Microsystems, 21 F. Supp.
2d at 1119-25.
14. See Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1362; Intergraph, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1279; Dell Computer
Corp., No. 931-0097 (F.T.C. 1996).
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intellectual-property rights in systems technology with liability rules
rather than with the more traditional property rules. 15 I will show
that courts and regulators are slowly beginning to recognize the
advantages of this approach and that although this approach is not
unproblematic, it can be justified on the basis of both economic policy
and legal precedent.
Part I of this Article explores how courts have analyzed
competition and intellectual-property rights in high-technology
industries. Although courts have traditionally granted strong
intellectual-property rights to technological innovators, a few
exceptions have begun to appear in systems-technology cases. Part II
investigates the context in which these exceptions are arising. It
examines the characteristics of systems-technology industries and the
particular importance of the choice between open standards and
strong property rights in these industries. Part I argues that the
industry characteristics discussed in Part II create a heightened need
for the law to promote compatibility and open-access standards. Part
III then considers whether liability-rule protection is an appropriate
method for such promotion. After analyzing the advantages and
disadvantages of protecting systems-technology developers with
liability rules rather than property rules, I conclude that, as a matter
of economic policy, a liability-rule regime is preferable. Part IV
examines the doctrinal foundations upon which such a regime might
rest. In Part V, the analysis turns to the implications of the preceding
discussion for the current legal dispute between Microsoft
Corporation and the Justice Department. The Article concludes with
some final thoughts and observations.
I. Intellectual-Property Rights in Technology Industries
A. The Creation of Property
Property rights exist only to the extent that the legal system is
15. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972), for the leading
exposition of property rules and liability rules. These rules are discussed in greater detail
below. See infra text accompanying notes 27-29. Although two previous articles have
mentioned the distinction between property rules and liability rules while discussing the
protection of certain types of technological information, see Trotter Hardy, Property (and
Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CH. LEGAL F. 217 (1996) (arguing that the law should
protect informational works in cyberspace with property rules); Julie S. Turner, Comment,
The Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a Theory of Efficient Infringement, 86 CAL.
L. REV. 179 (1998) (arguing that nonmanufacturing patent owners should have their
entitlements protected by liability rules rather than property rules), neither discussed
these rules in the context of systems technology.
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willing to recognize and enforce them. 16 For each form of property,
the law must decide whether to (a) create private ownership rights in
that property or (b) leave the use and control of that property
unregulated. Where real property is concerned,17 the law almost
always decides in favor of creating private property rights. The
theory is that such rights produce the proper incentives for efficient
resource use; without them, individuals would both overuse resources
and underinvest in their improvement.18
Where intellectual property is concerned, the legal system also
generally decides to create property rights, but it does so in a much
more limited manner and under a somewhat different theory. Once
created, intellectual property exhibits some of the features of a
"public good": it is nonrivalrous, meaning that its use by one person
does not impinge upon its use by another, 9 and it may be non-
excludable, meaning that a person cannot feasibly prevent another
from taking advantage of it.20 Both of these features have important
implications for the decision of whether to create intellectual-
property rights. The nonrivalrous nature of intellectual property
eliminates concerns about its overuse. Indeed, this characteristic
suggests that once the property has been created, there are no social
benefits to keeping its use restricted, and in fact, there may be
benefits from disseminating it as widely as possible.21 At the same
time, the non-excludable nature of much of this property raises
questions about the desirability of implementing an enforceable rights
system-the costs of monitoring and limiting the use of freely
available information may well render such a system infeasible. If, on
the other hand, creators of intellectual property can exclude others
16. "Legal system" here refers not only to the courts, but to legislators and
government regulators as well.
17. Such property generally includes land and whatever stable assets are attached to it.
18. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.1 (5th ed.
1998); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE LJ. 1315 (1993); Garrett Hardin,
The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968); Carol M. Rose, The Several
Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83
MINN. L. REv. 129, 129-30 (1998).
19. This is not to say that certain individuals may not be hurt, economically or
otherwise, by another person's use of the intellectual property. The point is merely that
their capacity to use the property themselves will not diminish.
20. Of course, the creation of enforceable property rights is an attempt to increase
excludability by providing a legal mechanism against unsanctioned use. Even without
such a mechanism, however, the holders of intellectual property may be able to exclude
others through extralegal means, such as secrecy. See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at
Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 255 (1998);
Rose, supra note 18, at 147; see also infra Section II.D.
21. For instance, one innovation often inspires another, and therefore disseminating
intellectual property throughout the community may increase the community's overall
level of technological achievement.
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from using it without legal mechanisms, then it becomes unclear
whether a system of legal rights is necessary.22
Nonetheless, several arguments counsel in favor of creating
private ownership rights for intellectual property. Most notably,
investment concerns analogous to those in the real property context
are particularly important in the intellectual-property field.
Assigning entitlement rights to the creators of this property allows
them to recoup their investment costs and profit from their creations,
thereby greatly increasing the chances that creation will occur in the
first place2 3 Similarly, where the intellectual property relates to a
standardized technology, creating property rights in it may ensure
that at least one party-the holder of these rights-has an incentive
to improve the standard with further innovations.24
The traditional legal solution has been to strike a compromise
between property rights and open access: an innovator who creates
intellectual property receives an enforceable private ownership right
in it-in the form of a patent, copyright, or trademark-but this right
expires after a fixed period of time. In theory, the prospect of
garnering profits during the ownership period should be sufficient to
stimulate innovative endeavors, and after this period, all barriers to
the optimal utilization of the resulting innovations disappear.25 Thus,
the intellectual-property laws seek to serve the dual purpose of
"promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare. '26
This does not end the matter, however, for once the legal system
has decided to create private ownership rights, there remains the
secondary question of how to protect those rights. Here, the basic
choice is between property rules and liability rules.27 Under the
22. Cf discussion infra Section II.D. Note, however, that even if legal mechanisms for
exclusion are not necessary, they may still be desirable if they are socially cheaper than the
private mechanisms.
23. But see infra Subsection III.B.1 (arguing that first-mover advantages and other
factors may make entitlement rights unnecessary to spur technological innovation).
24. See David Friedman, Standards as Intellectual Property: An Economic Approach,
19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1109, 1122-23 (1994); see also infra text accompanying notes 93-
100 (discussing standardization in more detail).
25. See, e.g., IAN J. LLOYD, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW 197 (1993); Peter S.
Menell, An Epitaph for Traditional Copyright Protection of Network Features of Computer
Software, ANTITRUST BULL., Sept. 22,1998, at 651.
26. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 1 (1995), reprinted in
THE 1995 FEDERAL ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, 69-111 (ABA 1996) [hereinafter IP GUIDELINES].
27. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 15, at 1091. There is also a third option,
"inalienability rules," but this type of protection does not hold much attraction in the
intellectual property context, as there is typically no reason why producers of such
property should be prohibited from sharing it with others.
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former set of rules, the holder of the property interest can prevent
others from exploiting the property without his or her consent.
Under the latter set of rules, the interest holder cannot prevent others
from exploiting the property but receives financial compensation
(typically in accordance with some preset rule) from those who do so.
There has recently been much academic debate over the relative
merit of property rules and liability rules as methods of protecting
property interests.28 Nonetheless, the norm in the legal system has
been and continues to be the use of property rules. When the law
confers a possessory interest in property-whether tangible or
intellectual-the holder of the interest can generally rest assured that
no one will be able to use that property without his or her consent.29
Anyone wishing to gain access must negotiate the terms of such
access with the interest holder.
B. Systems Technology and Property Rights: A New Form of Ownership?
Although the legal system continues to grant intellectual-
property rights to innovators and to protect those rights with property
rules, exceptions have begun to appear in the context of what I shall
call "systems technology." This Section will first define systems
technology and then proceed to examine the legal exceptions it has
produced.
28. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between Consensual and
Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability Rules, 105 YALE L.J. 235 (1995); Ian Ayres & Eric
Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade,
104 YALE LU. 1027 (1995); Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedrak The
Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091 (1997); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE
L.J. 221 (1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules:
An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1996) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell,
Property Rules Versus Liability Rules]; see also Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The
Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175 (1997) (arguing that, because of differences in the domains
of tort, property, and contract, the analysis provided by Calabresi & Melamed, Ayres &
Talley, and Kaplow & Shavell may have only limited applicability in the realm of property
law (and, by extension, intellectual-property law)).
29. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (Deering's 1994) (providing that patent holders
have the right not to license their patents); IP GUIDELINES, supra note 26, § 2.2. The
main exception to this general rule comes in cases of emergency; the law will often permit
a person to make use of another's property if this is necessary to avoid extreme hardship
in a crisis, provided that the person later compensates the property owner for the use. See,
e.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908) (holding that a person may moor his boat on
another person's dock to avoid a life-threatening storm); Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp.
Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910) (holding that a person mooring his boat to another's dock
during a storm must pay the dock owner for any damages that result). This exception has
little relevance in the intellectual-property context, in which such emergencies are unlikely
to arise.
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(1) What is systems technology?
Systems technology is the technology that defines and governs
the computing environments within which people operate. It includes
both hardware and software. On the hardware side, systems
technology provides the architecture of the computer system: it
determines what can connect to the system and what can operate
within it. Hardware elements of systems technology therefore include
such features as the bus design 30 and the input/output (I/O)
interfaces.31 Similarly, the software elements of systems technology
determine the programs that the platform can support and the
information it can access. The operating system is the most obvious
example, but Internet browsers (which determine the computer's
ability to access web sites) and word processors (which determine the
computer's ability to read text files from other sources) qualify as
well. Systems technology, in short, comprises the hardware and
software that define the parameters of the computing environment-
the metatechnology, if you will, that frames the system.
32
A few courts have indicated, explicitly or implicitly, that
intellectual-property disputes involving systems technology may
require a nontraditional form of resolution. Specifically, they have
indicated that the nature of this technology may justify protecting
property rights with liability rules rather than with property rules. To
understand how and why this has occurred, it is necessary to examine
the precise circumstances of the disputes that have produced this
emerging shift in the law.
30. The "bus" is the device that connects a computer's Central Processing Unit (CPU)
to the memory and to the various other hardware components of the system. If the CPU
is a computer's brain, the bus is the central nervous system that transmits its commands to
the rest of the body. As one technology expert described it: "Physically, a bus is a set of
conductive paths that serves to interconnect two or more functional components of a
system or several diverse systems. Electrically, a bus is a collection of voltages, levels, and
signals that allow the various devices connected to the bus to work properly together."
Desktop Imaging & Bus Design, SCITECH J., Sept. 1995 (quoting Thomas Floyd of Digital
Fundamentals).
31. These interfaces, or "ports," are the devices through which the computer connects
to peripheral components such as printers, video monitors, modems, and external drives,
as well as to other computers (via a network or otherwise).
32. This conception of systems technology should not be confused with the notions of
"systems" and "systems markets" that Katz and Shapiro use in their economic analysis.
See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. EcoN.
PERSP. 93, 93 (1994) [hereinafter Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition]. Their conception
of "systems" includes any "collection of two or more components together with an
interface that allows the components to work together," and it therefore encompasses
such combinations as nuts and bolts, camera bodies and camera lenses, and video
components and video programming. Id at 93. The concept of "systems technology"
used in this Article is a distinct subset within the broad category of "systems" that Katz
and Shapiro define.
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(2) Intergraph v. Inte133
Intergraph arose out of an intellectual-property dispute between
Intel, the world's leading manufacturer of computer microprocessors,
and Intergraph, a graphics workstation manufacturer whose products
depend upon Intel technology3 The controversy began in 1994,
when Intel abruptly decided to move from an "open architecture"
design, which allowed industry participants to build onto its
microprocessor technology with ease, to a "closed architecture"
design, which prevented these participants from incorporating the
technology without Intel's consent.35 If equipment manufacturers
were to continue to build components and systems compatible with
Intel technology, they would be dependent upon Intel's agreeing to
share its technical information with them-information that fell
within the scope of its intellectual property. Thus, as the district court
observed, "[t]his 'closed architecture,' for practical purposes,
allow[ed] Intel, by exercising its intellectual-property rights in its
'closed architecture,' to wield absolute power over who will and who
will not be allowed to participate in that part of the high-end
computer industry that is based upon the [Intel] microprocessor.
36
And wield this power it did. Initially, Intel freely shared
information concerning its intellectual property with Intergraph,
thereby allowing the company to continue developing workstations
that utilized Intel microprocessors. By 1997, however, Intel had
become concerned that Intergraph might be able to pursue patent
infringement claims against it.37 To prevent this, the company
proposed a contractual agreement that would have given it the right
to use all of Intergraph's patented technology without cost.38 When
Intergraph balked, Intel responded by "summarily and unilaterally"
cutting off all of Intergraph's access to its technology and demanding
that the company return all previously shared intellectual-property
information.39 This left Intergraph, which like other manufacturers
depended upon access to Intel's technology, unable to produce
profitable workstations. It could not switch to another
microprocessor, for as the court explained: "Intergraph ha[d] ...
invested enormous financial and engineering resources to design and
33. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998), vacated and
remanded, 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999), and on remand, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (N.D. Ala.
2000).
34. See id. at 1259-73.
35. See id. at 1261-62.
36. Id. at 1262.
37. See id. at 1266-67.
38. See id
39. See id. at 1267.
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build its products and systems based on Intel's CPUs.... As a result
of the migration to Intel's CPUs, Intergraph [was] technologically and
economically 'locked-in' to [them] for at least the next two to three
years." 4 Moreover, even if Intergraph had not been locked into the
Intel technology, the recognized status of this technology as the
industry standard would have substantially impaired Intergraph's
ability to compete effectively using another microprocessor. 41
Significantly, Intel's actions not only injured Intergraph but also
impaired competition. The primary reason for this was that the
relationship between the two companies had recently become more
than simply a supplier-customer relationship. Intel was in the process
of entering Intergraph's segment of the workstation market, and the
two companies had therefore become direct competitors.42 By
terminating Intergraph's access to its microprocessors, Intel was
attempting "to control and dominate competition in [the graphics
subsystem and workstation] markets." 43  Its efforts to eliminate
Intergraph "depriv[ed] customers of alternative and improved
technology in these markets, stifl[ed] innovation, reduc[ed]
competition in price and quality, and impair[ed] competition
generally."44
Intergraph responded to Intel's termination of its access
privileges with a barrage of legal claims. In its amended complaint,
the company asserted twenty-three claims under a variety of legal
theories, including fraud, breach of contract, patent infringement, and
antitrust.45 This gave the district court a broad choice of frameworks
for analyzing the dispute. Though it ultimately elected to focus on an
antitrust framework,46 the court could just as easily have framed the
transdoctrinal matter in other terms. At its core, Intergraph's suit
presented simply another variant of the central issue that pervades
intellectual-property law in general: the choice between strong
property rights and open access to information. Either Intel's
40. Id at 1264.
41. See id at 1260 ("Intel's dominance in the market for personal computer CPUs is
reflected in its name recognition among the computer buying public, the great majority of
whom insist upon having a genuine Intel CPU in their computers.").
42. See id. at 1270 ("Intel has entered the graphics subsystem market and is now a
direct competitor of Intergraph in that market."). Although the Federal Circuit disagreed
with much of the district court's analysis, see infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text, it
did not dispute this factual finding. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346,
1355, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
43. Intergraph, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.
44. I&
45. See &L at 1258.
46. See id. at 1274-91 (granting preliminary injunction due to the "substantial
likelihood" that Intergraph will prevail on its claims of monopolization, refusal to deal,
and unlawful restraint of trade).
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intellectual-property rights entitle it to share its microprocessing
innovations as it sees fit, or the corporation is obliged to share them.47
Under these circumstances, intellectual-property issues and antitrust
concerns collide, but this presents neither cause for concern nor
analytical difficulty, as the principles of the two doctrines are more
complementary than oppositional. Both exist to maximize social
welfare through the promotion of innovation and competition.
48
Sensitive to this higher purpose, the Intergraph district court
struck a compromise between strong property rights and open
access.49 The court acknowledged the "strong" public interest in
protecting economic competition that underlies the antitrust laws,
and it recognized that Intel's refusal to share its technology had a
significant anticompetitive effect.50 At the same time, it refused to
extinguish Intel's intellectual-property rights, implicitly recognizing
that such rights may play an important role in fostering innovation.51
Rather than eliminate these rights or allow Intel to exercise them in
restraint of competition, the district court found a middle ground. It
reaffirmed Intel's proprietary rights in its microprocessing technology
but established that those rights would be protected only by a liability
47. The distinction between strong property rights and open-access requirements in
this context is somewhat analogous to the distinction between "public" and "private"
paradigms that James Boyle has articulated. See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE,
AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCrION OF THE INFORMATION SocIETY 25-34
(1996).
48. See, e.g., Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th
Cir. 1997); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1990) ("[IThe aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may seem, at first glance,
wholly at odds. However, the two bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are
aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and competition.") (citing Loctite Corp. v.
Ultraseal Ltd., 791 F.2d 861, 876-77 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); IP GUIDELINES, supra note 26, § 1
("The intellectual-property laws and the antitrust laws share the common purpose of
promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare."); cf Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The immediate effect of our copyright law is to
secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good."). For general
discussions of the common impetus behind the antitrust and intellectual-property
doctrines, see Joel M. Cohen & Arthur J. Burke, An Overview of the Antitrust Analysis of
the Suppression of Technology, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 421, 423-24 (1998); Willard K. Tom &
Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to Unified
Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167 (1997).
49. In this way, the court's solution echoes the general compromise between the two
options that intellectual property law as a whole represents. See supra text accompanying
notes 25-26.
50. See Intergraph, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1281-82; see also id, at 1271 (describing Intel's
termination of information access as an "unreasonable and anticompetitive" restraint of
trade).
51. But cf. infra Subsection III.B.1 (arguing that weakening intellectual-property rights
may not diminish technological innovation).
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rule, not by the usual property rule.
The court reasoned that because Intel possessed monopoly
power in the microprocessor market,52 it had "affirmative duties as a
monopolist not to misuse its monopoly power and to compete in a
manner that does not unreasonably or unfairly harm competition. '53
These duties, in its view, included the obligation to provide other
companies with "[r]easonable and timely access to critical business
information that is necessary to compete," regardless of whether that
information was subject to intellectual-property protection.54 But this
did not mean that Intel had to supply its technology for free-Intel
retained the right to charge Intergraph for access to its intellectual
property, as long as it did so in a nondiscriminatory matter (i.e., as
long as it provided access to Intergraph "at the same time," "in the
same manner," and on "the same terms" as it did to Intergraph's
"similarly situated competitors"). 55  The court's concerns about
promoting competition led it to impose a liability rule: Intergraph
had the right to gain access to Intel's systems technology, but it had to
compensate Intel for that access.
56
Thus, in the original Intergraph decision, antitrust concerns
define the parameters within which intellectual-property law
operates5 7  Intellectual-property entitlements grant exclusionary
52. The record showed that Intel had an 88% share of the market for high
performance microprocessors and a 100% share of the market for Intel microprocessors,
which the court deemed to be separate and relevant. See Intergraph, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1260,
1275.
53. ld. at 1277.
54. I- at 1278.
55. Id. at 1277, 1291-92. Significantly, the existence of similarly situated competitors
allowed the court to avoid the valuation problems that commonly plague the imposition of
liability rules. See infra Subsection III.B.4. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 15, at 1108-09; Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining
Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75,77-78 (1994).
56. There is a significant distinction, however, between the original Calabresi-
Melamed liability rule and the liability rule imposed here. Under Calabresi and
Melamed's original conception, the amount of compensation is "a value determined by
some organ of the state rather than by the parties themselves." Calabresi & Melamed,
supra note 15, at 1091. In contrast, the Intergraph court did not set the price of
compensation, though it did set the terms and conditions.
57. This is not to say that other areas of law do not also provide parameters. The use
of intellectual-property rights is further constrained by contract law, see, e.g., McCoy v.
Mitsuboshi Cutlery, 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[I]ntellectual property rights, like
any other property rights, are subject to the contractual obligations of their owner and the
applicable law."), tort law, see, e.g., Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, 153 F.3d
1318, 1331-37 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing extent to which state tort law constrains the
exercise of patent rights), and criminal law, see, e.g., United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) (inquiring into whether patent license agreements had
been used for criminal purposes). The point is that intellectual-property rights are not
exempt from antitrust scrutiny, as has often been argued, see infra note 72, but rather are
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rights to innovators, but they do not grant the right to engage in
anticompetitive behavior. Therefore, when the denial of access to
technology would raise serious antitrust concerns, the proprietary
rights in that technology relax slightly, and the law shifts from a
property-rule regime to a system of liability-rule protections.
Although the Federal Circuit ultimately overruled the district court
and vacated its injunction,58 it did not contradict these central
principles. Rather, the Circuit based its holding on its belief that
Intergraph had not sufficiently established the anticompetitive effects
of Intel's conduct.59 Had such effects been demonstrated to the
subject to limitations from that body of law as well.
58. See Intergraph, 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Circ. 1999).
59. See id. at 1367. This belief was in turn based on the Circuit's questionable theory
that if a monopolist in one market uses its monopoly power to injure a business with which
it is competing in a second market, the injured competitor cannot succeed in an antitrust
claim without showing that the monopolist possessed market power in the second market
as well. See, e.g., id. at 1360. To justify its application of this theory to Intergraph's
leveraging claim (i.e., Intergraph's allegation that Intel had used its monopoly power in
the microprocessor market to gain a competitive advantage in the graphics subsystem and
workstation markets, in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act), the Federal Circuit
cited two Eleventh Circuit precedents. See id. at 1360. The first, Aquatherm Indus., Inc. v.
Florida Power & Light Co., 145 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 1998), held that a monopolist cannot
be held liable for leveraging if it does not compete in the allegedly leveraged market. See
145 F.3d at 1262. It therefore has little relevance to the leveraging allegations against
Intel, which was competing with Intergraph in the markets at issue. See supra text
accompanying notes 42-44. The second case cited by the Federal Circuit in support of its
theory was Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1985). The
Circuit claimed that Amey "stated that the use of a position in one market to gain an
advantage in another market is not an illegal market restraint unless 'a significant fraction
of buyers or sellers are [sic] frozen out of a market."' Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1360
(supposedly quoting Amey, 758 F.2d at 1503-04). In fact, however, neither the quoted
material nor any paraphrase of it appears in Amey. The quote instead comes from the
Supreme Court's decision in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 45
(1984), a case that concerned charges of anticompetitive vertical arrangements under
section 1 of the Sherman Act, not monopolistic leveraging under section 2.
These problems aside, the Federal Circuit's view of leveraging requirements under section
2 is not devoid of precedential or academic support. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports v.
McQuillian, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948
F.2d 536, 547-49 (9th Cir. 1991); James May, Redirecting the Future: Law and the Future
and the Seeds of Change in Modern Antitrust Law, 17 MiSS. C. L. REV. (1996) (discussing
the Chicago School's view of monopoly leveraging). The validity and wisdom of its view,
however, is currently a matter of great dispute in both the federal judiciary and the legal
academy. See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 7.9 (2d
ed. 1999); Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 515 (1985); Mark R. Patterson, Coercion, Deception, and Other Demand-Increasing
Practices in Antitrust Law, 66 ANTrrRUST L.J. 1, 80-88 (1997). Even if the view is correct,
the Federal Circuit may have erred when, in its evaluation of possible anticompetitive
effects, it failed to consider that upholding Intel's conduct towards Intergraph may pave
the way for monopolist to take similar measures against its other competitors in the
graphics markets, virtually all of whom are dependent on Intel microprocessors. See
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Circuit Court's satisfaction, the decision of the district court would
have stood.
(3) In re Dell Computer Corporation 6
A similar legal dynamic arose in the Federal Trade Commission's
(FTC's) investigation of Dell Computer Corporation (Dell), where
once again, the dispute centered around systems technology. The
FTC alleged that Dell had engaged in "deceptive acts" and "unfair
methods of competition" while participating in an organization that
set industry standards for computer architecture. 61 The organization,
the Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA), had designated
technology known as the "VL-bus" as the industry standard for bus
design, and this technology had then been widely adopted. 62 After
the adoption of the VL-bus design standard, Dell asserted that it
controlled a patent that gave it "exclusive rights to the mechanical
slot configuration used on the motherboard to receive the VL-bus
card. ' 63 Dell then attempted to enforce this patent, informing
computer manufacturers that their implementation of the VL-bus
technology violated Dell's intellectual-property rights and demanding
that these rights be recognized.64 According to Dell, these rights
allowed it to exclude anyone it wished from the use of its technology.
If manufacturers wanted to use the VL-bus standard, they had to
negotiate their access to that standard with Dell, who retained the
right to refuse such access or to demand compensation for it.
Under the framework of the original Intergraph decision, the
resulting dispute between Dell and the computer manufacturers
would not be difficult to resolve. As with Intel, Dell's intellectual-
property rights gave it control of a technology that other industry
participants needed to compete and survive. There was a substantial
threat that, by preventing certain manufacturers from accessing this
technology, Dell could both stifle competition and exclude its rivals.
The question was: Should Dell's property rights be upheld in their
strong, exclusionary form, or were the interests in open access and
competition sufficient to trump those rights? Based on these facts
alone, the Intergraph solution would be to strike a compromise: Dell
would retain its proprietary rights in the technology but be able to
enforce them only through liability rules. Although Dell would then
Intergraph, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1270-71.
60. No. 931-0097 (F.T.C. 1996).
61. Federal Trade Comm'n, Consent Order, 62 Fed. Reg. 4767 (1997).
62. See Dell Computer Corp., No. 931-0097 (F.T.C. 1996); Dell Consent Agreement,
60 Fed. Reg. at 57870-72 (1995).
63. Dell Computer Corp., No. 931-0097 (F.T.C. 1996).
64. See idU
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be unable to exclude others from using the VL-bus, it could force
them to compensate it for this use.
There was, however, a significant twist in the Dell case that
distinguished it from Intergraph. Not only did Dell retain intellectual-
property rights that arguably allowed it to control access to the VL-
bus technology, but as a member of VESA, it had been an active
participant in the decision to adopt that technology as the industry
standard.65 Dell representatives had been on the VESA committee
that approved the VL-bus standard.66  Moreover, these
representatives had, consistent with regular VESA practice,
repeatedly certified in writing that the proposed standard did not
"infringe on any trademarks, copyrights, or patents" that Dell
possessed. 67 The purpose of requiring such certifications was to
ensure that no VESA member would be able to impede access to the
technological standard adopted-precisely what Dell then attempted
to do.
The FTC determined that because Dell had misrepresented its
intellectual-property rights during the standard-setting process, the
company had forfeited the benefits to which these rights would
normally entitle it.68 However, its decision to deny Dell the ability to
wield these rights in an exclusionary manner was based upon
considerations that would have applied even if no misrepresentation
had occurred. The FTC alleged that Dell's actions constituted an
unreasonable restraint of competition because:
(a) Industry acceptance of the VL-bus design standard was
hindered because some computer manufacturers delayed their use
of the design standard until the patent issue was clarified.
(b) Systems utilizing the VL-bus design standard were avoided due
to concerns that patent issues would affect the VL-bus' success as
an industry design standard.
(c) The uncertainty concerning the acceptance of the VL-bus
design standard raised the costs of implementing the VL-bus design
as well as the costs of developing competing bus designs.
(d) Willingness to participate in industry standard-setting efforts
65. See id.
66. See id. ("[B]y June 1992, VESA's Local Bus Committee, with Dell representatives
sitting as members, approved the VL-bus design standard.").
67. Id
68. See id; Dell Consent Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. at 57872 (citing Potter Instrument
Co. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 641 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1981)); cf. Studiengesellschaft Kohle v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315, 1325 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the laches defense
may be invoked in patent infringement suits "where the plaintiff has unreasonably and
inexcusably delayed in prosecuting its rights and where that delay has resulted in material
prejudice to the defendant").
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have [sic] been chilled. 69
Suppose that Dell had not directly participated in the standard-
setting process and that VESA had nonetheless selected the VL-bus
design as the industry standard. Suppose further that, following the
adoption of this standard, Dell had come forward and begun asserting
its patent rights against manufacturers who were implementing the
VL-bus in their products. Although no fraud or misrepresentation
would have occurred, the competitive concerns enumerated in the
FTC complaint would remain valid.70 Under the FTC's reasoning,
Dell's exertion of its patent privileges is anticompetitive regardless of
the company's prior involvement in the standard-setting
proceedings.71 The theory implicit in the FTC's resolution of this
dispute is therefore identical to the theory at work in Intergraph v.
Intel: When access to systems technology is vital to industry
competition, such access cannot be restricted through the
exclusionary use of intellectual-property rights. Had Dell not
engaged in deliberate fraud, it would have retained the ability to
enforce its patent rights, but these rights would have been protected
merely by a liability rule, not by the property rule that typically
applies. By engaging in fraud, however, Dell lost the right to enjoy
even this degree of protection, and its patents were effectively
terminated.
(4) Pinpointing the doctrinal shift of Intergraph and Dell Computer
Intergraph and Dell Computer represent a subtle but important
shift in the law-a movement away from the automatic imposition of
property-rule protections in intellectual-property regimes. Before
examining the impetus behind this shift and its merits, it is important
to make the character of the shift as clear as possible.
In both Intergraph and Dell Computer, the legal system
responded to the choice between strong property rights and open
access with a liability-rule solution. These cases imply that antitrust
concerns act as binding constraints upon the scope of intellectual-
property entitlements in technology industries72; when exclusionary
69. Dell Computer Corp., No. 931-0097 (F.T.C. 1996).
70. See also Federal Trade Comm'n, Dell Computer Settles FTC Charges; Won't
Enforce Patent Rights for Widely Used Computer Feature, Nov. 2, 1995, available in 1995
WL 641656 (news release stressing the general importance of open-access standards in
high-technology industries).
71. The existence of the standard itself, however, is important to the FTC's reasoning.
See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
72. They may also constrain entitlement use more generally, though that is a subject
beyond the scope of the present inquiry. Note also that this conception of the relationship
between antitrust and intellectual-property doctrine is at odds with the traditional
conception, which views intellectual-property rights as state-sanctioned monopolies that
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entitlements can impede competition and innovation, the law moves
to a system of liability rules that ensure access to the technology at
issue.
There is, however, a central difference between the operation of
the liability rule in the systems-technology context and the operation
of such rules in most other contexts, including compulsory-licensing
regimes and eminent-domain proceedings. The difference stems from
the distinction between ownership and access. As a number of
scholars have observed, the state's eminent domain power is
essentially a system of liability-rule protections.73 This power permits
the state, in certain circumstances, to force property owners to
relinquish their land for a price.7 4 When the state exercises this
power, title in the land transfers from one party to another, the
private owner loses all rights to the land, and the state gains complete
control of it. Compulsory licensing also functions as a liability-rule
system, as it permits parties to force patent holders to share their
technology in return for compensation.75 In that context, the party
"protected" by the liability rule does not lose her ability to exploit the
property, but the party receiving the property still receives it in full, in
the sense that his ability to control and exploit it is generally
coextensive with that of the original owner. There is one exception,
however, as the property recipient typically does not enjoy licensing
privileges, which remain within the original owner's exclusive control.
With the form of liability rule implemented in Intergraph, there can
be an even greater disparity between the rights of the original owner
and those of the compensating party. What matters in systems-
technology disputes is that the compensating party receive access to
the property at issue, not ownership of the property itself. For
instance, in Intergraph, it was important for Intergraph to be
unimpeded in its ability to make products compatible with Intel's
technology, not necessarily for it to have full information about that
trump the competitive concerns embodied in the antitrust laws, see e.g., ERNEST
GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KovAcIc, ANTITRUST LAW & ECONOMIcS 409 (4th ed.
1994); Cohen & Burke, supra note 48, at 423 ("For many years, courts have suggested that
there is a "conflict" or "tension" between the intellectual-property laws and antitrust laws.
One set of laws was viewed as creating monopolies.., and the other sought to restrain
and limit monopolies.") (citing, inter alia, Simpson v. United Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24
(1964); Chrysler Motors v. Auto Body Panels, 908 F.2d 951, 954 (Fed. Cir. 1990)), even
more than the conception that is now emerging, see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 195-215 (1985); Calabresi & Melamed,
supra note 15, at 1106-07; Epstein, supra note 28, at 2111-19; Thomas W. Merrill, The
Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61 (1986).
74. See sources cited supra note 73.
75. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1308-17 (1996); Merrill,
supra note 73, at 96.
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technology.76
The differences among these various liability-rule schemes can
be conceptualized within a simple general framework. Three
different types of ownership rights can be at stake in technological-
property disputes: (1) the right to access to the technology, (2) the
right to full information about the technology, and (3) the right to
control the disposition and dissemination of the technology. The
precise content of these rights, particularly the first two, may vary
from case to case. Because access is a continuous variable, and
because meaningful access takes different forms in different
industries, it is difficult to define a legal standard for it in the abstract.
In Intergraph, the district court determined that a nine-part injunction
was necessary to guarantee meaningful access to Intel's
microprocessor technology.77 The injunction required, inter alia, that
Intel provide Intergraph with product design information, samples of
microprocessor prototypes, advanced product allocations, and
inclusion in its marketing events.78 In Dell Computer, however, the
FTC determined that meaningful access to the VL-bus technology
could be ensured merely by barring Dell from pursuing patent
infringement claims against rival manufacturers. 79 Because the design
specifications of the VL-bus standard were already known throughout
the industry, no further measures were necessary.
These cases illustrate that the appropriate standard for
determining whether access to a technology exists is not rigid and
absolute. Rather, a functional approach is necessary: a company
possesses access to a technology if it can manufacture commercially
viable products that incorporate or are compatible with that
technology.80 Similarly, a functional standard is necessary for
76. Cf. Friedman, supra note 24, at 1119-20 (contrasting the employment of a
dominant technology with the employment of another technology that is compatible with
the dominant technology). It is true that the distinction between ownership and access
becomes somewhat fuzzy in Intergraph, as Intergraph arguably requires full licensee
privileges to manufacture compatible products, but this will not necessarily be the case in
all such circumstances.
77. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255,1291-93 (N.D. Ala. 1998).
78. See id.
79. See Dell Computer Corp., No. 931-0097 (F.T.C. 1996).
80. Note that this standard has both informational and temporal components. As the
Intergraph court emphasized, it was not enough that Intergraph simply receive the
technological information necessary for the manufacture of compatible products. It was
also necessary that Intergraph receive this information at the same time as its competitors.
Given the pace of the industry, a delay of as little as a month "would prevent Intergraph
from maintaining a competitive presence in the.., market" and therefore render its access
meaningless. Intergraph, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1269. Note also that there is some ambiguity
inherent in a functional standard of this sort-reasonable parties may disagree over
whether a particular measure is necessary for technological access.
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determining whether a company possesses "full information" about a
particular technology. Although the courts have yet to adopt such a
standard,81 one could easily be derived from the body of law that
governs patent disclosures. 82 Unlike the right to access a technology
and the right to full information about a technology, the right to
control the disposition and dissemination of a technology is
straightforward. Either a company possesses the authority to share
and license a particular innovation, or it does not.
If a liability regime conferred all three of these rights on the
compensating party, the result would be a system much like the
eminent domain system that applies to real property, in which there is
a total transfer of ownership and control from the original
rightsholder to the compensator.83 Compulsory-licensing regimes
81. The primary context in which courts would need such a standard is that of
compulsory-licensing disputes. Statutory compulsory-licensing provisions, however, are
extremely rare in American law and almost never give rise to legal conflicts. See Kenneth
J. Nunnenkamp, Compulsory Licensing of Critical Patents Under CERCLA?, 9 J. NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 397, 400-07 (1994). Judicially compelled licensing is relatively
more common, but it usually comes about through a court's refusal to issue an injunction
against an alleged infringer. See ic at 412-13. In these cases, the licensees already possess
sufficient technological information, so the courts do not need to develop disclosure
standards. Should compulsory licensing become a more prominent feature of American
law, however, the courts will need to develop more definite standards for the amount of
information that licensers must divulge.
82. Upon applying for a patent, an innovator must disclose enough technical
information so that the public can fully exploit the innovation once the patent expires. See
generally DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTs §§ 7.01-.05 (1994) (discussing the purposes and
intricacies of patent disclosure requirements). To this end, federal law requires each
patent applicant to file a written "specification." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1999). The law states
that:
The specification shall contain a (1) written description of the invention and (2)
of the manner of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and (3) shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Id. These requirements could form the basis for a standard for determining whether a
compelled licenser had provided its licensees with sufficient information.
83. In such a system, the recipient would gain the ability to disseminate the
technology, and the innovator might or might not retain these rights as well. Admittedly,
it is hard to imagine a circumstance in which we would want an innovator to share
technology with parties who were willing to pay, grant those parties the right to share the
technology with others, and lose the ability to share it with others herself. Nonetheless,
there could be situations in which this might occur. For instance, assuming that the
government could exercise its eminent domain power over intellectual property, it might
wish to use that power to remove a particular technology from the private sector. This
possibility is not as outrageous as it might sound. Cf. Lionel Marks Lavenue, Patent
Infringement Against the United States and Government Contractors Under 28 U.S. C.
§ 1498, in the United States Court of Federal Claims, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 389, 393-96
(1995) (arguing that the eminent domain power does extend to intellectual-property
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stop short of this and confer only the first two types of rights on
compensating parties: the right to access and the right to full
information. In systems-technology contexts, by contrast, the recent
cases point to a liability rule that confers only the access right. Thus,
the shift that occurs in Intergraph and Dell Computer is a shift to the
least intrusive type of liability rule possible, one that allows
innovators to retain significant exclusive rights in their technology.
Under what circumstances do competitive concerns become
sufficient to justify this shift to liability rules? At least a partial
answer can be found in the commonalties of Intergraph and Dell
Computer. Both cases involved standardized systems technology, and
the existence of standardization was crucial to the outcome of each
dispute. In Intergraph, access to the microprocessor technology was
vital because that technology had been adopted as the industry
standard, so Intergraph could not survive without incorporating it
into its systems.84  Similarly, Dell's exclusionary actions were
problematic not because they impeded access to systems technology,
but because they impeded access to systems technology that had been
endorsed as a standard.s5
entitlements). Consider, for instance, the argument that it is contrary to the public interest
for private parties to develop encryption techniques capable of thwarting law enforcement
officials. One way to eliminate the risks of private experimentation with encryption
technology while continuing beneficial research might be to have the government assert
control over such research through an eminent-domain-like acquisition.
84. Indeed, the district court's repeated characterization of Intel as a monopolist
implicitly depended upon the status of its technology as a standard. Cf Intergraph Corp.
v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1277 (N.D. Ala. 1998) ("Accordingly, the court
concludes that Intel has violated its affirmative duties as a monopolist not to misuse its
monopoly power .... "). By definition, one cannot exert monopoly power if the market
contains reasonable substitutes for one's product. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Justice
& Federal Trade Comm'n, 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 13,104 (Apr. 7, 1992) (defining the relevant product market for
determinations of monopoly power). Thus, if it had been feasible for Intergraph to
compete using an alternative to Intel's microprocessing technology (i.e., if Intel's
technology had not been adopted as an industry-wide standard), it would not have been
possible for the court to characterize Intel as a monopolist. Therefore, because the court
relied heavily upon this characterization in making its ruling, the ruling was implicitly
dependent upon the standardized nature of the Intel technology.
85. The FTC made clear that Dell would have been entitled to exercise its intellectual-
property rights in an exclusionary manner had VESA selected a different technology to be
the standard. See Federal Trade Comm'n, News Release, June 17, 1996, available in 1996
WL 328839.
There was also another important similarity between the two cases. In both of them,
circumstances were such that the court (or, in the case of Dell Computer, the FTC) could
impose a liability rule without becoming entangled in the valuation problems that typically
accompany such rules. See discussion supra note 55 and accompanying text; discussion
supra Subsection I.B.3. The importance of this will be discussed in more detail below. See
discussion infra Subsection III.B.4.
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The effect of the doctrinal shift towards liability rules is therefore
to promote the development of open-access standards in systems
technology. The doctrine seeks to ensure that all market participants
can make their products and innovations compatible with this
technology. 86 As a consequence, the doctrine may also promote
standardization itself, as it averts the possibility that parties will be
excluded from a technology and respond by developing competing
standards, 87 or it may reduce standardization, as it allows firms to gain
information about their rivals' technology that they can use to
develop competing standards.
88
86. Note again that it does not seek to ensure that all market participants have access
to internal information about such technology or that their control of the industry
standard becomes equal to that of the technology's developer.
87. Cf. Diane W. Savage, Intellectual Property Due Diligence in Acquisitions of
Technology Companies, 985 PLI/CoRP 329, 350 (1997) (arguing that patent-sharing
arrangements can be anticompetitive when "they involve a large percentage of firms that
could be expected to develop competing technologies"). To the extent that the doctrine
promotes standardization in this manner, however, the impact may not be great because,
in many cases, the development of a competing standard will be too costly to be feasible
for an excluded firm. See infra note 99.
88. It is important not to confuse standardization with compatibility. Standardization
exists when a large consumer base uses a single technology. Compatibility concerns the
relationship between technologies, and it exists when different technologies can utilize
identical units of a complementary technology. Cf. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro,
Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822, 823
(1986) [hereinafter Katz & Shapiro, Technology Adoption] (providing a similar
definition). The matrix below illustrates the distinction between the two concepts with an
example drawn from the Intergraph case. It depicts possible combinations of
standardization and compatibility for microprocessor technology (an analogous matrix
could be used to depict operating system technology, VL-bus technology, etc.). Intel,
Motorola, and IBM are assumed to be the three microprocessor manufacturers, with their
respective market shares indicated by their size. Real 3D, Compaq, and Intergraph are
assumed to be hardware designers whose systems require microprocessors. A line
between a hardware designer and a microprocessor manufacturer indicates that the
former can utilize the technology of the latter. For the sake of simplicity, the grid only
depicts compatibility relationships that include the Intel microprocessor technology-
compatibility with Motorola products and IBM products is not shown.
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Having defined the nature and implications of the doctrinal shift
at work in Intergraph and Dell Computer, it is appropriate to inquire
into both the impetus behind this shift and its desirability. Why does
the tension between strong intellectual-property rights and open-
access standards keep arising in the context of systems-technology
disputes? Is it significantly different in this context than in other
intellectual-property contexts? And should the legal system respond
by striking a compromise that rewards innovators while encouraging
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Box4
Box 1 depicts the case in which Intel's technology is standardized (i.e., it has an
overwhelming market share) and fully compatible with existing hardware systems. Every
hardware manufacturer is able to design products that incorporate the standardized Intel
microprocessor. In Box 2, Intel's microprocessor remains fully compatible with the
various hardware platforms, but microprocessing technology is not standardized-Intel,
Motorola, and IBM each control a third of the market (and by assumption, each uses a
different technological design). In Box 3, standardization exists, but compatibility is
limited. Compaq and Real 3D can access and incorporate Intel technology, but
Intergraph cannot and risks being frozen out of the market. This is the situation that
produced the actual Intergraph litigation. Box 4 depicts a situation in which neither
standardization nor compatibility (at least, not full compatibility) exist. Intergraph cannot
design products that work in conjunction with Intel technology, but it will remain viable if
it can utilize the technology of Intel's rivals. Although the example assumes that each
microprocessor manufacturer uses a different technology, this need not be the case.
Different manufacturers may produce products that employ identical technology, and if
they do, technological standardization can occur without any one firm dominating the
market.
Also, although standardization and compatibility can exist independent of one
another, the two are not always unrelated. For instance, industries can achieve
interproduct compatibility by standardizing their interface specifications.
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I. Why Access Disputes Permeate Systems Technology: An
Examination of Market Characteristics
It is no accident that the conflict between strong property rights
and open standards continues to arise in systems-technology
industries, and the reasons for its persistence merit attention.
Because this conflict underlies all of intellectual-property law to some
extent, its pervasiveness in systems-technology disputes should not be
entirely surprising. In the systems-technology context, however, the
issue manifests itself in a somewhat novel form-and is particularly
likely to be the subject of legal controversy-due to four
characteristics of the markets for this technology: network
externalities, interconnectivity, rapid innovation, and excludability.
A. Network Externalities
First, and perhaps most importantly, systems-technology markets
exhibit what economists refer to as "network effects" or "network
externalities." Network externalities arise when the utility that a user
derives from a product increases with the number of other individuals
who also use the product.89 These externalities have several sources.
Direct network externalities exist when the number of users affects
the quality of the product itself.90 Communications products such as
telephones and fax machines exhibit this type of effect, as these
products become more useful as more individuals obtain them.
Indirect network externalities exist when the number of users affects
the availability of complementary products and services, which in turn
affects the value of the core product.91 For example, if more
individuals purchase laser disc players, film distributors will find it
more profitable to release their movies in laser disc format, which will
result in more movies being available in that format, which will
increase the value of the players to their users. Similarly, if more
individuals come to own laser disc players, the availability of repair
and maintenance services can be expected to increase as well, which
again will add to value of the players themselves.
89. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985) [hereinafter Katz & Shapiro, Network
Externalities].
90. See id.; see also Mark Shurmer & Gary Lea, Telecommunications Standardization
and Intellectual Property Rights: A Fundamental Dilemma?, in STANDARDS POLICY FOR
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 378,379 (Brian Kahin & Janet Abbate eds., 1995).
91. See, e.g., Jeffrey Church & Neil Gandal, Network Effects, Software Provision, and
Standardization, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 85, 85 (1992) ("The benefit from consuming durables
often depends on the consumption of supporting or complementary goods."); Katz &
Shapiro, Network Externalities, supra note 89, at 424; Shurmer & Lea, supra note 90, at
379.
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Systems-technology markets contain both direct and indirect
network externalities. To the extent that computer users wish to use
their platforms to communicate electronically with others, the utility
of a system increases with the number of users who utilize compatible
technologies. Furthermore, the greater the number of users that exist
for a systems-technology product, the more likely it is that hardware
and software producers will develop goods compatible with that
product, and the more likely it is that support services for that
product will be widespread.92
Network externalities push systems-technology markets toward
standardization. Consumers prefer technologies that allow them to
participate in large user networks and that benefit from thick markets
of complementary goods and services. 93  Because of these
preferences, producers have strong incentives to create products that
provide these benefits.94  Thus, dominant technologies tend to
become entrenched, and when no technological standard dominates,
"developers and consumers are both likely to gravitate towards the
system they think will come to dominate, helping to ensure that that
system does in fact become dominant. ' 95 This dynamic, which
economists term "tipping, '96 results in a "natural tendency towards de
facto standardization" in markets with strong network effects.97
Whether the social benefits of such standardization outweigh its
costs is subject to dispute.98 But once a technological standard exists,
hardware and software manufacturers will not be able to compete
unless their products are compatible with it.99 Exclusion from
92. These dynamics work in the other direction as well: The greater the number of
complementary products and support services that exist for a systems technology product,
the more attractive it will be to consumers, and the more widespread it is therefore likely
to become. Cf Church & Gandal, supra note 91, at 85 ("The decision of software
developers regarding which technology to provide software for affects the market share of
hardware technologies, or alternatively, the size of each network.").
93. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and
Innovation, 16 RAND. J. ECON. 70, 70-71 (1985); Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities,
supra note 89.
94. See Katz & Shapiro, Externalities, supra note 89.
95. Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L.
REV. 1041, 1049 (1996). Lemley makes this comment in the context of Internet
technology, but it applies equally to systems technology in general.
96. See, e.g., id.; Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Competition, Compatibility and
Standards: The Economics of Horses, Penguins, and Lemmings, in PRODUCr
STANDARDIZATION AND COMPETITIVE STRATEGY (H. Landis Gabel ed., 1987); Katz &
Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 32, at 93.
97. Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 32, at 95.
98. See infra Subsection III.A.1.
99. A firm unable to produce compatible technology would only be able to compete
successfully by developing and promulgating a new standard compatible with its own
products. While this might produce beneficial competition in the "market" for standards,
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standardized systems technology is therefore tantamount to exclusion
from the market itself. With access to this technology vital to industry
participants, exclusion is almost certain to produce litigation.10 This
provides a partial explanation of why conflicts between intellectual-
property rights and access demands are so prominent in systems-
technology markets.
B. Interconnectivity
A second notable feature of systems technology is its high level
of interconnectivity. Individual systems-technology products, be they
hardware or software, have little value in and of themselves. Rather,
they combine with other complementary and supplementary
components to form a complete computing system, which generally
consists of a CPU, memory, a system bus, input/output ports, various
peripherals, an operating system, and a variety of application
programs. All of these components must be compatible with one
another for the system to function, and all of them are typically
manufactured by different producers.
Thus, once a technological standard comes to govern a particular
component, producers of the other components must have access to
that standard for their products to remain successful.101 The existence
the creation and promotion of a new standard can be a rather Herculean task and is not a
feasible option for most industry participants. Persuading users to switch from one
standard to another is particularly difficult in technology markets because these markets
typically exhibit path dependence, meaning that once consumers invest in a particular
product (or standard), they are unlikely to make choices in the future that require them to
abandon that product. See Lemley, supra note 95, at 1050; Richard T. Rapp, How
Economists See Competition Problems in High-Technology Industries, C137 ALI-ABA
139, 148-50 (1995); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 641 (1996). Path dependence occurs in systems technology markets for at least
two reasons: (1) individuals who work to become familiar with a particular system, and
who invest in equipment and training specific to it, will be reluctant to switch to another
system, and (2) individuals often create large amounts of data that can only be accessed on
their particular system, which again makes them reluctant to switch to another system
(unless their databases and files will be readable in the new system). See Lemley, supra
note 95, at 1050; Rapp, supra, at 149.
100. Cf. Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that Sega cannot use its copyright entitlements to prevent a competitor from
disassembling its code and thereby engineering compatible products); United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 49-54 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding that Microsoft attempted
to exclude rival Internet browsers from its operating system technology); Intergraph Corp.
v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998) (discussed supra Part I); Dell Computer
Corp., No. 931-0097 (F.T.C. 1996) (discussed supra Part I).
101. As one commentator has noted, "[flor creators of computer programs, achieving
interoperability with particular computers and operating systems is necessary for
commercial survival." Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic
Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1091, 1093 (1995). This statement is as true for hardware developers as it is for
[Vol. 51
THE KEEPERS OF THE GATES
of network externalities makes standardization a likely outcome in
systems-technology markets, and the high level of interconnectivity in
such markets means that once a technology becomes standardized,
producers of a wide variety of complementary and supplementary
products will depend on access to it. An attempt by the developer of
the standardized technology to limit this access can therefore threaten
the commercial existence of numerous parties throughout the
industry. This dynamic compounds the exclusionary potential of
intellectual-property rights and contributes to the prevalence of
property-rights/open-access disputes involving systems technology.
C. Rapid Innovation
In general, innovation and product evolution occur extremely
rapidly in high-technology markets, and systems-technology markets
are no exception.1°2 Technology companies must constantly upgrade
their products or introduce new products if they wish to remain
competitive. 03  Perhaps the most notable evidence of this
phenomenon accompanied the release of Microsoft's Windows 95
operating system software. As this operating system became the
industry standard, hardware technology that could not meet its
processing-speed, memory, and hard-disk requirements quickly
became obsolete, as did software that was not able to run in the
Windows 95 environment. 1°4
The rapid pace of innovation in computer industries has two
important effects that increase the likelihood of legal disputes over
access to systems technology. First, parties who hold intellectual-
property rights in systems technology need not completely exclude
other parties from this technology to cause them substantial harm.
Merely delaying access-by prolonging licensing negotiations, for
instance-can severely damage or eliminate companies who produce
complementary products. 05  Second, companies that produce
software developers.
102. See, e.g., Robert Prentice, Vaporware: Imaginary High-Tech Products and Real
Antitrust Liability in a Post-Chicago World, 57 OHIO. ST. LJ. 1163, 1171 (1996). See
generally Rapp, supra note 99, at 145-48. Note that although the rate of technological
development is rapid, the rate at which standards are adopted may not be. The latter rate
will depend on such factors as the strength and number of competing standards and the
ability of industry participants to coordinate with one another.
103. See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 102, at 1171.
104. See, e.g., Amy Cortese, The Software Revolution, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 4, 1995, at
78; Mary Kathleen Flynn & Patricia Peart, Technology's Holiday Bounty, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Nov. 20, 1995, at 90; Adam Meyerson, Gearing Up for Windows 95, PC
COMPUTING, Sept. 1995, at 455; cf Michael Berube, The Buying Game, VILLAGE VOICE,
Oct. 31, 1995, at 25 (providing anecdotal evidence of the difficulties of purchasing
computers while technological standards are changing).
105. Cf. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1274-75, 1287-90 (N.D. Ala.
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complementary products do not have the option of waiting for
intellectual-property rights to expire. While these rights are only of
limited duration, they endure for a number of years,106 at the end of
which the systems technology is almost certain to be obsolete. Access
will then be meaningless, and any excluded firms that depended upon
such access will have long since vanished from the market.
D. Excludability
Developers of systems technology can easily exclude other
parties from accessing their products, even without the assistance of
the legal system. The two primary methods for this are secrecy and
exclusionary engineering.
Exclusion through secrecy is possible because the development
of products compatible with a given systems technology may require
detailed internal information about that technology. Developers may
not be able to discern this information simply by studying the
technology,1°7 the research required for such discernment may be too
costly, or this research may be so time-consuming that, given the
rapid pace of the industry, the information will be obsolete by the
time it is obtained. Under any of these conditions, other developers
will be unable to produce compatible products unless the developer
of the systems technology relinquishes its internal information.108
This dynamic is possible due to the complex nature of the technology;
in most industries, secrecy is not a viable method of exclusion because
once a product is on the market, anyone can examine it and design
compatible products. 10 9
1998) (finding that a delay in Intergraph's access to Intel's systems technology would cause
Intergraph substantial and irreparable harm).
106. In the case of most patents, the duration is twenty years. See 35 U.S.C. § 154
(Deering's Supp. 1999).
107. But cf. Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research
and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. Acnvrry 783, 810 tbl.9 (1987)
(finding that major patented innovations were imitated by rival firms within three or fewer
years in a majority of the industries surveyed).
108. Cf. Affidavit of Wade Patterson 1 7, quoted in Intergraph, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1265
n.28 ("Information [concerning Intel's microprocessor technology] which was no longer
contained in product data books, but necessary for product development, was migrated
into packets of confidential information .... ).
109. For instance, consider the technology involved in railroad transportation. The
"systems technology" in rail systems are the rails themselves, which determine what
vehicles can travel the railroad and what other transportation systems (i.e., other rail
networks) the railroad can connect to. As in the digital systems technology context, there
are significant network externalities in the choice of which type of rail to use (if all
railroads use the same or compatible rails, they will be accessible to all trains and able to
connect to one another). It is therefore unsurprising that a uniform standard for rails
emerged early in the history of railroad development. See Dennis W. Carlton & J. Mark
Klamer, The Need for Coordination Among Firms, with Special Reference to Network
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Developers can also achieve exclusion through certain
engineering tactics. A company producing a systems technology can
design it to be compatible only with certain products, either by
designing it to accept only products with particular characteristics or
by designing it not to accept products with particular
characteristics. 110 Again, exclusion of this sort is possible only
because of the complex nature of the underlying technology.
Through both secrecy and exclusionary engineering, systems-
technology developers can often prevent other market participants
from accessing their products. When this occurs, those seeking access
must persuade the developers to share their intellectual property with
them, and the developers may refuse, thereby instigating a legal
dispute over whether intellectual-property rights permit such refusal.
E. Summary
The combination of network externalities, interconnectivity,
rapid innovation, and excludability in systems-technology markets
creates a situation in which intellectual-property rights and access
demands are likely to come into conflict. Network externalities cause
systems technology to become standardized, which makes access to
the technology vital to industry participants. The high level of
interconnectivity increases the number of participants that require
such access, and the rapid pace of the market necessitates that they
obtain access as quickly as possible. The nature of systems
technology, however, enables its designers easily to exclude others
from the technology, so that those seeking access can obtain it only if
the designers themselves share their intellectual property with them.
Of course, intellectual-property rights and access demands still
would not come into conflict if designers were in fact willing to share
their intellectual property. But because exclusion typically allows
Industries, 50 U. CI. L. REV 446, 456-57 (1983). It would not be possible, however, for
the producer of railroad tracks to exclude certain vehicles from using them (or to exclude
other rail networks from connecting to them) simply through secrecy, as anyone could
simply examine the physical details of the tracks and then manufacture a vehicle capable
of traveling on them. Exclusion through secrecy is only possible when the underlying
technology is sufficiently complex.
110. See, e.g., Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992)
(adjudicating a dispute involving a Sega computer system designed not to accept cartridges
that lack a secret "compatibility code" found only in Sega-manufactured cartridges); Atari
Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (analyzing a similar
situation); Sun Microsystems v. Microsoft Corp., No. C 97-20884 RMW (PVT), 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17985 (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 14, 1997) (alleging that Microsoft engineered its
Java system so that it would not accept programs written in Sun's programming language);
cf. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 49-54 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding that
Microsoft attempted to bias its operating systems against supporting Internet browsers
made by competing companies). See generally Cohen, supra note 101.
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designers to increase their profits-indeed, a central premise of the
intellectual-property system is that exclusive rights enhance returns
on investment"'-they have little incentive to provide free access to
their creations.
m. Are Liability-Rule Protections for Systems Technology
Socially Beneficial?
The preceding discussion has focused on the private value of
access and the private cost (to the entitlement holder) of achieving it.
The discussion will now turn to the social benefits and costs of
technological access. The same market characteristics that foster
access disputes in systems-technology industries suggest that it would
be socially beneficial to resolve these disputes with a liability-rule
approach-the very approach that Intergraph and Dell Computer
exemplify. At the same time, however, there are several potential
costs to this approach. The discussion that follows will weigh the
potential social benefits and potential social costs of a liability-rule
regime.
A. Factors That Counsel in Favor of Liability Rules
As discussed in Part I, weakening intellectual-property
entitlements by adopting liability-rule protections would increase
compatibility and decrease exclusion in systems-technology markets.
The question, then, is whether these effects are socially desirable
given the particular characteristics of those markets. Each
characteristic discussed in Part II suggests that these effects would
indeed be beneficial.
(1) Network externalities
Network externalities produce a substantial bias towards
standardization in systems-technology industries, though it is
uncertain whether the resulting level of standardization will be
socially optimal. Standardization can provide benefits to consumers
by lowering the transaction costs associated with collecting product
information and by assuring them some minimum level of quality in
their purchases." 2  It also increases the benefit of network
111. See supra text accompanying note 23.
112- See, e.g., Sean P. Gates, Standards, Innovation, and Antitrust: Integrating
Innovation Concerns into the Analysis of Collaborative Standard Setting, 47 EMoRY L.J.
583, 598 (1998); Douglas D. Leeds, Raising the Standard; Antitrust Scrutiny of Standard-
Setting Consortia in High Technology Industries, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 641, 644 (1997). Related to these benefits is the fact that standards facilitate
product comparison, and this will tend to promote price competition among the products.
See Gates, supra, at 598; Leeds, supra, at 644.
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externalities by funneling users onto the same network, thereby
increasing both network size and the demand for complementary
products.11 3 In fact, some degree of standardization is necessary if
user networks are to exist at all. Furthermore, once a standard is
established, it may enhance entry and competition in both the
primary and complementary markets, as market stability will increase
and the danger of rapid obsolescence will diminish.
14
On the other hand, standardization can facilitate a range of
anticompetitive practices: firms that control standards can use them
to exclude their rivals and thereby monopolize markets,115 and
standards can be vehicles through which firms collude with each
other, both tacitly and explicitly.116  In addition, technological
standardization can stifle innovation in several ways. First, even if a
particular standard is optimal when adopted,1" 7 the market can
become "locked in" to the standard so that it remains in use long
after superior technologies have become available." 8 Second, the
adoption of a standard can prevent superior technologies from
becoming available by narrowing the innovative endeavors of
113. See Gates, supra note 112, at 598-99; Leeds, supra note 112, at 645-48.
114. Cf. Gates, supra note 112, at 599 ("In an industry plagued by memories of the
bloody VHS/Beta video tape war, the [videodisk design] standard may be procompetitive
because it (1) encourages manufacturers to enter the disk player market by allaying fears
of obsolescence, (2) alleviates the risk of producing videodisks because the single standard
ensures consumer acceptance .... ).
115. See Gates, supra note 112, at 598-600; discussion supra Section II.D.
116. See Gates, supra note 112, at 600 (noting that standards can reduce product
complexity and thereby assist cartels in policing their members); Leeds, supra note 112, at
649; Albert N. Link, Market Structure and Voluntary Product Standards, 15 APPLIED
ECON. 393,395 (1983).
117. In certain circumstances, markets may adopt a technology as a standard even
though it is not the best option available. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner,
Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannoucements, and Predation,
AM. ECON. REV. 940, 942 (arguing that "excess momentum in markets can cause
consumers to adopt new standards that are inferior to the old ones"); Michael L. Katz &
Carl Shapiro, Product Introduction with Network Externalities, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 55
(1992) (arguing that when network externalities exist, firms have incentives to introduce
their products to the market sooner than is socially desirable); Katz & Shapiro,
Technology Adoption, supra note 88, at 831 ("When standardization does occur, the
socially optimal technology may not be selected; there are biases in the market's choice of
a standard."); Garth Saloner, Economic Issues in Computer Interface Standardization, 1
ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECHNOLOGY 135, 153 (1990) (noting that many
commentators believe the Beta videotape standard was superior to the VHS standard that
prevailed against it).
118. See discussion supra note 99 (discussing path dependence in technology
industries); Gates, supra note 112, at 601-12 (discussing manner in which standards
produce economic and psychological barriers to the acceptance of new technology); Katz
& Shapiro, Technology Adoption, supra note 88, at 830-33.
August 2000] THE KEEPERS OF THE GATES 1103
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
competing firms" 9  and by reducing the standard-developer's
incentives to improve its technology. 20
Given these various costs and benefits, the optimal level of
standardization in any particular industry is unclear, and markets may
not produce this optimal level on their own.121 It is also unclear
whether shifting from an intellectual-property regime that employs
property rules to one that employs liability rules will increase or
decrease the overall level of standardization.'2 Despite these
uncertainties, two facts appear to be relatively free of dispute. First,
there is a consensus in the economic literature that, regardless of the
optimality of the level of technological standardization that occurs,
the level of technological compatibility will be sub-optimal; in
industries with network externalities, firms have insufficient
incentives to make their products compatible with those of other
firms.1 3 Second, whenever a firm or collection of firms controls
access to a standardized technology, that control can be used in an
anticompetitive manner; to gain monopoly power or other economic
benefits, the controlling firm or firms may well have strong incentives
to exclude other firms. 24 Both of these facts indicate that it is
appropriate for the legal system to promote compatibility and to
ensure access to standardized technology beyond what the market is
likely to provide on its own.1 5
119. See, e.g., Leeds, supra note 112, at 649 ("[Clonsumers are deprived of non-
compatible technological innovations that would have been developed absent the
standard.").
120. This is the so-called "X-inefficiency" that commonly arises whenever monopolies
exist. See, e.g., F.M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress, in REVITALIZING
ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY 130, 135-36 (Harry First et al. eds., 1991); cf Joel
Dreyfuss, Living with Windows 98, FORTUNE, Sept. 28, 1998, at 284 (arguing that the
Windows 98 operating system is not a significant improvement over Windows 95).
121. Compare Katz & Shapiro, Technology Adoption, supra note 88 (arguing that in
certain situations, the market will produce excessive standardization), with Church &
Gandal, supra note 91 (arguing that if consumers place a high value on technological
variety, the market will produce a sub-optimal amount of standardization).
122. See supra note 87-88 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Converters, Compatibility, and the
Control of Interfaces, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 9 (1992) (finding that when an important
technology is supplied only by a single firm, that firm will have an incentive to make
conversion overly costly); Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities, supra note 89
(presenting a model in which "firms' joint incentives for product compatibility are lower
than the social incentives"); Katz & Shapiro, Technology Adoption, supra note 88 (finding
that "compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market"). This market failure occurs
because the designing firms are unable to capture the full benefits of compatibility.
124. See supra note 115 and accompanying text; Shurmer & Lea, supra note 90, at 386;
cf Intel Corp. v. Intergraph Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998); Dell Computer
Corp., No. 931-0097 (F.T.C. 1996).
125. Significantly, in the telephone communication industry, which also exhibits strong
network effects and is in many ways the closest technological precursor to the systems
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(2) Interconnectivity
The high level of interconnectivity in systems-technology
markets also increases the need for open access to such technology.
A decision to restrict access to a systems-technology product can
retard innovation and competition in multiple sectors of the industry.
For instance, technical information concerning the microprocessor
and bus design of a computer is necessary not only to workstation
manufacturers, 126 but to the manufacturers of virtually every internal
computer hardware component, from memory chips to power
supplies, and to software developers who tailor their products to the
platforms that will run them.127 Given all of the complementary
products that require access to systems technology, the efficiency
consequences of exclusion are likely to be tremendous.' 28 Their
magnitude will depend upon the economic importance of the
excluded firms-the larger a producer is and the fewer substitutes
there are for its products, the more socially costly its exclusion will be.
Furthermore, interconnectivity increases the likelihood of
exclusion as well as the social costs of exclusion in systems-technology
industries. If dependence upon a particular technology is widespread,
its developer is more likely to restrict access to it in an effort to
extract economic rents.129 The dynamic is analogous to one discussed
by Thomas Merrill in the context of real property and eminent
domain.130 Interconnectivity arises when a developer (e.g., the
technology industries discussed here, the government chose to require telephone
companies to grant one another access on reasonable terms. See Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-613 (1999)). This modified the companies' property rights in much the same
manner as the liability-rule regime proposed herein. Cf. Epstein, supra note 28, at 2119-20
(analyzing the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as a type of constrained liability rule);
Lemley, supra note 95, at 1060-62 (noting that federal telecommunications law modifies
intellectual-property rights to promote interoperability).
126. See Intergraph, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1255.
127. Cf. INTEL CORPORATION, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT ("Intel's strategy has been, and
continues to be, to introduce ever higher performance microprocessors and work with the
software industry to develop compelling applications that can take advantage of this
higher performance .... ").
128. The combination of interconnectivity and standardization results in these products
"depending" upon access to a greater extent than would otherwise be the case. In many
industries, developers excluded from a particular technology can find ways to design
around the protected component and thereby compete without access to it. This will not
usually be a feasible option, however, when the protected technology is both
complementary to the developer's product and the industry standard. Intergraph cannot
design around the Intel bus any more than computer manufacturers can design around
Dell's standardized system architecture design.
129. These rents could come in the form of financial payments extracted in return for
access or in the form of monopoly profits.
130. See Merrill, supra note 73, at 72-93.
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government) needs to acquire a number of contiguous land parcels
for a project.131 Because the consent of each landowner is necessary
for the project to go forward, a single landowner can attempt to
extract economic rents from the other parties-both the developer
and the other landowners-in return for his or her consent.132 Merrill
observes, "As the number of parcels and/or the site-dependence [i.e.,
the need to access those particular parcels] increases, the
opportunities for rent seeking multiply.' 1 33 The same holds true in
the systems-technology context: more products that are dependent
and higher levels of dependence increase the incentives and
opportunities to foreclose access.
Thus, because interconnectivity raises the costs of permitting
exclusion and increases the likelihood that exclusion will occur, its
existence reinforces the argument for protecting systems-technology
entitlements with access-enabling liability rules.
(3) Rapid innovation
Rapid technological innovation increases the costs of a property-
rule regime by greatly reducing the value of the information released
when an intellectual-property right expires. Where design
information remains valuable for a period longer than the term of
intellectual-property entitlements, there are fewer costs to permitting
unilateral exclusion because excluded parties will at least be able to
benefit when the information becomes public. In systems-technology
industries, however, the term of intellectual-property entitlements
typically exceeds the useful life of technical information, 134 and this
increases the costs of protecting such entitlements with exclusionary
property rules. Rapid innovation therefore strengthens the argument
for permitting access to technology prior to the expiration of the
innovator's proprietary entitlements.
(4) Excludability
The inability of developers to design complementary technology
without the entitlement holder's consent eliminates the standard
method of innovating and competing in the face of intellectual-
property protections. This inability stems not just from the
131. See id. While Merrill does not explicitly invoke the concept of interconnectivity,
its importance is implicit in his analysis.
132. This is the standard hold-out problem, familiar to economists and other scholars of
strategic behavior. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 18, at 62; Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 15, at 1093-95.
133. Merrill supra note 73, at 82.
134. See supra Section II.C.
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possibilities of secrecy and exclusionary engineering 35 but also from
the fact that interconnectivity and standardization typically prevent
developers from designing around a patent.136 If developers wish to
create ancillary technology or to learn from the innovations contained
in the core technology, they must negotiate directly with the designer
of that technology.137 This makes anticompetitive exclusion possible,
and the potential for such exclusion provides the primary impetus for
moving to a policy of liability protections for systems technology. 38
(5) Summary
Network externalities produce standardization in systems-
technology industries, and the developers of the standardized
technology may lack sufficient incentives to give technological
information and access to other developers, even when this would
improve social welfare.139 Their refusal to allow access to their
intellectual property-or their attempts to exact large rents in return
for such access-can severely diminish competition and innovation,
particularly given the high level of interconnectivity in systems-
technology industries and the long term of intellectual-property rights
relative to the useful life of the information they protect. The
adoption of a liability-rule system that reduces such exclusion could
therefore significantly improve social welfare and economic
performance.
(6) Final note on anticompetitive behavior in systems-technology industries
The anticompetitive use of intellectual-property rights is more
than just a theoretical possibility. Intergraph, Dell Computer, and
U.S. v. Microsoft'4° all provide examples of systems-technology
innovators wielding their property rights in an exclusionary and
arguably anticompetitive manner. In all these cases, the allegedly
anticompetitive behavior takes the same basic form. Manufacturers
of complementary products seek access to protected technology, and
135. See discussion supra Section II.D.
136. See discussion supra note 128.
137. Of course, they need not do this if the designer elects, as Intel did for a number of
years, not to pursue secrecy or exclusionary engineering. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel
Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255,1261 (N.D. Ala. 1998). In that case, however, they depend upon
the designer's continuing decision not to engage in either of those practices.
138. The above discussion assumes, to a certain extent, that the rightsholder has some
interest in complementary markets. Without an interest in these markets, the rightsholder
might want to foster competition in them through the release of its intellectual property-
provided that it could share that property with complementary designers while continuing
to exclude potential competitors.
139. See supra Subsection lII.A.1.
140. Discussed infra Part V.
the innovator attempts to use intellectual-property rights as a basis
for denying such access and thereby gaining an economic advantage.
Intellectual-property rights can be used anticompetitively in other
ways as well. A firm can obtain a "preemptive patent" on technology
that it has no intention of implementing but that it wishes to prevent
rival firms from implementing.141 Alternatively, a firm can refuse to
license a particular technology except in conjunction with other
technologies, thereby effectively tying the technologies together and
forcing other firms to purchase more technologies than they desire.142
In oligopolistic markets, intellectual-property pooling and cross-
licensing techniques "may serve both to organize the market and limit
interfirm competition, and to exclude possible entrants."'143
To be successful, most of these anticompetitive practices require
that the pertinent intellectual-property right be subject to property-
rule protections. With liability rules, a holder of intellectual-property
rights can, within limits, raise the costs of access to a technology, but
the rightsholder cannot deny such access to those willing to pay a
reasonable price.144 A firm could still use preemptive patents to
impose costs on its rivals,145 and pooling arrangements could still
141. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981); Cohen & Burke,
supra note 48, at 428-29; Maurits Dolmans, Restrictions on Innovation: An EU Antitrust
Approach, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 455,467-73 (1998); Rapp, supra note 99, at 148.
142. See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917); Grid Sys. Corp. and Tandy Corp. v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 1991-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 69,446 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Rapp, supra note 99, at 148. Some commentators
maintain that firms will not tie complementary products because doing so will not allow
them to increase their overall profits. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORIK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 140 (1978); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 171-73 (1976). Even if such tying cannot increase profits, however, firms
may still engage in it if they miscalculate its potential profitability or if they are not
interested merely in profit maximization. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 59, at 547-52 (arguing
that firms may systematically misperceive the profitability of tying and that they may tie
products to maximize sales or growth).
143. CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 167 (1965). Possible
examples of this phenomenon in the systems-technology context include alliances among
microprocessor developers. Several of these developers have elected to share their
intellectual property and cooperate in the creation of microprocessing architectures. See,
e.g., Linley Gwennap, Room for Three Architectures in the 2000s, MICROPROCESSOR
REPORT, July 11, 1994, at 14 (describing the formation of a partnership between Intel and
Hewlett-Packard to compete with the technological alliance of Motorola, IBM, and
Apple).
144. Thus, liability-rule regimes may actually promote a higher degree of information
access than regimes without any legal protection for intellectual property. If no
intellectual-property rights existed, developers could still refuse to share their technology,
but once property rights become protected through liability rules, the developers cannot
refuse such access to anyone able to pay for it.
145. While the implementation of a liability-rule regime would not eliminate this
practice, it would constrain it. Liability rules would only allow firms to impose finite
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serve to organize markets and facilitate collusion. But firms could no
longer use their intellectual-property rights for exclusionary purposes,
nor could they force tying arrangements upon their licensees. Thus,
under a liability-rule regime, there is much less danger that
intellectual-property rights will become mechanisms for reducing
competition and innovation.
With these benefits in mind, it is time to consider some of the
potential costs of a liability-rule regime for systems technology.
B. Potential Disadvantages of Liability Rules
The potential drawbacks of liability rules as methods of
protecting systems-technology entitlements fall into four broad
categories, each of which is examined below.
(1) Effects on incentives to innovate
If intellectual-property rights provide incentives for
innovation,146 weakening those rights could reduce innovative
endeavors. And property rights certainly become weaker when the
law shifts from a property-rule system to a liability-rule system, as this
shift removes the exclusionary power from the bundle of privileges.
For this reason, theorists have traditionally argued against moving to
nonexclusionary entitlement systems, maintaining that such a move
would produce a socially undesirable reduction in innovation.147
As a theoretical matter, however, it is unclear whether
weakening intellectual-property entitlements will reduce the overall
production of innovations. First, although weakening these
entitlements may reduce the individual incentive to innovate, it also
results in a greater diffusion of those innovations that do occur. This
diffusion permits firms to learn from the technological advances of
others, and the knowledge they gain may enhance the productivity of
their own innovative efforts.148 Whether this spillover effect is strong
enough to overcome reduced innovation incentives will depend upon
increases in their rivals' costs, as opposed to the infinite increases that are possible through
exclusion in property-rule systems.
146. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The
Rationales and the Reality, 33 IDEA 349, 363 (1993) ("[A] strong patent system is
necessary for investment and innovation. Compulsory licensing would only serve to
weaken granted rights, thus diminishing... innovation and thereby decreasing
opportunities for economic growth."). See generally ROBERT M. SHERWOOD,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1990); Donald J. Quigg,
Safeguarding Intellectual Property-Stimulus to Economic Expansion, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CAPITAL FORMATION IN THE NEXT DECADE 33, 36 (Charles E.
Walker & Mark A. Bloomfield, eds., 1988).
148. See Levin et al., supra note 107, at 805-07.
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the character of technological change in any given industry.149 If
spillover effects are sufficiently large, weakening intellectual-property
rights will reduce individual incentives to innovate but increase the
overall level of innovation. Conversely, strengthening these rights
may increase individual incentives to innovate but reduce the overall
level of innovation. Second, weakening intellectual-property
entitlements will not significantly decrease individual incentives to
innovate unless innovators rely upon these entitlements to
appropriate returns on their investments. If innovators can secure
adequate returns through mechanisms other than property rights-
such as secrecy or first-mover advantages, discussed below-changes
in the strength of these rights will not alter their investment behavior.
Empirical studies suggest that strong intellectual-property rights
may indeed not significantly increase the overall level of innovation.
For instance, an international study of pharmaceutical development
found only minimal correlation between the level of patent protection
and the level of innovation,150 and a number of studies that purport to
establish contrary results rely on faulty methodologies.151 Even if
intellectual-property rights do generally increase innovation, there is
reason to believe they do not have this effect in systems-technology
industries. Network externalities create large "first-mover
advantages" in these industries, and intellectual-property
entitlements may therefore be unnecessary for the appropriation of
investment returns. The first technology to enter the market will be
the first to acquire a network of users, who may not switch to a
superior technology that enters subsequently because doing so would
149. See id.; see also Richard Levin & Peter C. Reiss, Tests of a Schumpeterian Model of
R&D and Market Structure, in R&D, PATENTS AND PRODUCTIVITY 175 (Zvi Griliches
ed., 1984) (offering a model of the relationship between incentive and spillover effects in
innovation); Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, The Schumpeterian Tradeoff
Revisited, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 114,114-32 (1982) (same); Michael Spence, Cost Reduction,
Competition, and Industry Performance, 52 ECONOMETRICA 101, 101-21 (1984) (same).
150. See Pablo Chalid, The Consequences of Pharmaceutical Product Patenting, 15
WORLD COMPETITION: LAW & ECON. REV. 65, 65 (finding no strong relationship
between patent systems and invention in developed countries); cf. Linda Rabin Judge,
Issues Surrounding the Patenting of Medical Procedures, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 181, 212 (1997) ("The potential severity of the chilling effect which
widespread patenting will have on innovation is already apparent in patent-driven
industries such as biotechnology, where companies routinely have excessive controls on
dissemination of 'proprietary' information."). For a discussion of this evidence, see James
Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider
Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1453-55 (1992).
151. See Boyle, supra note 150, at 1454. Boyle notes that one such study relied on data
that the pharmaceutical industry itself supplied in response to a questionnaire on the
desirability of patent protection. See id. (discussing Edwin Mansfield, Patents and
Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. Sci. 173 (1986)).
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require them to lose the benefits of the established network.152
Systems-technology users often make significant nontransferable
investments in complementary assets that reinforce the first-mover
advantage. Once users have invested in complementary assets, such
as software programs and training, they often cannot switch to
another technology without replicating those investments, which they
may be reluctant to do.153 In addition, a firm may obtain substantial
advantages simply from being the first company that customers
associate with a particular technology,154 from being the first to start
down any learning curve associated with the technology's
production, 155 or from the fact that, once a technology is established
as sound and relatively error-free, conservative customers will be
unlikely to assume the risks of adopting a newer technology. 156 All of
these factors indicate that systems-technology developers may well be
able to earn adequate profits without intellectual-property rights, let
alone exclusionary intellectual-property rights.157
152. See William E. Cohen, Competition and Foreclosure in the Context of Installed
Base and Compatibility Effects, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 535, 541-46 (1996); Levin et al., supra
note 107, at 799-802. See generally Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-
Mover Advantages, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 41 (1988). A user switching from an
established technology to a new technology not only loses the direct network benefits of
the old technology, but also its indirect network benefits related to complementary
services and products. Cf discussion supra Section II.A.
153. See discussion supra note 99; Cohen, supra note 152, at 541. This gives innovating
firms incentives to market their technologies in ways that encourage users to make large,
non-transferable complementary investments; the greater these investments, the greater
the chance that an innovator's technology will become locked in as a standard. Firms may
try to achieve this effect by "bundling" their systems technology with non-transferable
complementary products or by encouraging users to purchase long-term service or
technical support contracts along with the technology.
154. See Joseph Farrell, Arguments for Weaker Intellectual Property Protection in
Network Industries, in STANDARDS POLICY FOR INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra
note 90, at 368, 369.
155. See Levin et al., supra note 107, at 799-802.
156. In general, early entrants enjoy first-mover advantages in industries where product
uncertainty is high and mistakes are costly. See SHARON M. OSTER, MODERN
COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS 74-76 (2d ed. 1994); cf. Rapp, supra note 99, at 149 (noting that
physicians, once satisfied with a drug, will be reluctant to abandon it). Both of these
features characterize systems-technology markets, in which product performance often
cannot be ascertained until after users have gained experience with the technology and in
which product failure can result in wasted investments and the loss of important
information.
157. Note, however, that the rapid pace of innovation in systems-technology industries
may reduce first-mover advantages. Users may not buy the first technology to enter the
market if they know that other technologies are likely to follow shortly thereafter-each
user has an incentive to wait for competing technologies to emerge and then choose from
among them-and this may lessen the advantages that accrue to the first entrant. This
incentive to wait is reinforced by the high level of uncertainty associated with new
technological products. Cf. supra note 156 and accompanying text. Consumers in rapidly
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This raises another important point, which is that although the
shift from property rules to liability rules weakens intellectual-
property rights, it does not weaken them greatly. Innovators retain
the ability to extract compensation from others who utilize their
technology, and if this compensation is set properly, the adoption of
liability rules should not significantly reduce the innovation
incentives. Indeed, the firms whose innovation incentives will be
reduced most will be those who seek to develop alternatives to their
own pre-existing products, establish intellectual-property rights in the
alternative technology, and then suppress that technology from the
market.158 Innovations produced in this manner, however, are not
socially beneficial, and the reduction of the incentive to engage in
such behavior is in fact procompetitive.
Whereas the incentive effects of changes in systems-technology
entitlements are likely to be weak, the spillover effects of such
changes are likely to be substantial. Computer technology tends to
progress through incremental innovation as advances occur
predominantly through minor improvements on pre-existing
products.159 As a consequence, innovators in hardware and software
industries often require access to the technologies of other firms. 16°
Increasing such access through non-exclusionary intellectual-property
entitlements will be likely to enhance innovative productivity
throughout these industries.
Given the above considerations, the argument that liability rules
would reduce the overall level of system-technology innovation seems
fairly weak. It does not appear that the adoption of these rules would
diminish the incentives to develop new technology greatly, if at all,
and any diminution that did result might be offset by an increase in
innovation made possible by the diffusion of technological
information.
(2) Effects on nonlegal exclusionary practices
As explained in Section ll.D, firms often use exclusionary
intellectual-property rights in conjunction with methods of exclusion
that are not based in the legal system, most notably secrecy and
evolving industries may also be more wary of investing in nontransferable complementary
assets.
158. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation, and
Antitrust, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS 47, 48-50 (Thomas M.
Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992) (hardware innovation); Rick S. Nathan, Valuation of
Software Inventions: What Are They Worth in Economic Terms?, SD35 ALI-ABA 145,
164 (1998) (software innovation); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the
Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308,2330-32 (1994) (same).
160. See Jorde & Teece, supra note 159, at 49.
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exclusionary engineering. At least one commentator has suggested
that if innovators lost the ability to regulate technological access
through legal means, they would invest more resources in achieving
such regulation through these alternative means.161 If these efforts
succeeded, the outcome would be the same as before-companies
seeking access to systems technology would be dependent upon the
consent of the innovator-and the cost to society would be greater, as
the incremental resources invested in maintaining excludability would
effectively be wasted.
The superficial appeal of this argument is deceptive. Firms
wishing to prevent the unlicensed use of their technology must have
the ability to monitor use of the technology and to impose penalties
on infringers. A shift from property rules to liability rules would
weaken their ability to do the latter. Under a property-rule regime,
firms can punish the unlicensed use of their technology with
injunctions and damages,162 but under a liability-rule regime,
injunctive relief is no longer available. One might therefore think
that to achieve the same level of deterrence in a system of liability
rules, firms would invest more resources in their monitoring
capacities.163 This would entail devoting more resources to secrecy
and exclusionary engineering, the techniques by which firms prevent
the nonconsensual use of their technology. The flaw in this reasoning
is that regardless of the penalties for infringement, a firm must invest
in sufficient exclusionary techniques so that others must negotiate for
access to its technology. Otherwise, the firm will be unable to
monitor the use of its intellectual property, which it must do to
prevent unlicensed exploitation under both property-rule and
liability-rule regimes. Under a property-rule regime, the firm will
want to ensure that it controls the diffusion of its technology and
secures compensation from those who use it. Under a liability-rule
regime, control of diffusion is no longer possible, but the firm must
still monitor usage to secure compensation. Although the goals of
monitoring change under the two systems, the level of monitoring
necessary to attain them does not. For this reason, a shift from
property rules to liability rules is not likely to increase significantly
the investments that systems-technology developers make in
restricting access to their intellectual property.
161. See Rose, supra note 18, at 146-50; cf Cohen, supra note 101, at 1094-95
(describing how manufacturers of video game systems have used exclusionary engineering
to prevent other companies from copying their technology and producing compatible
programs).
162. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-85 (Deering's 1994).
163. This assumes that damage awards could not or would not be sufficient to
compensate for the loss of injunctive relief.
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(3) Effects on development of private cooperative solutions
Yet another objection to liability-rule regimes stems from an
argument that Robert Merges recently advanced. Merges has
provided a general argument against the adoption of liability rules in
the intellectual-property context, based upon the effects of property
rights on private collective action.164  According to Merges,
intellectual-property entitlements should be designed to maximize
efficient market transactions,165 and the best way to facilitate these is
through strong, exclusionary property rights. 66 While such rights
ordinarily impede transactions in markets that exhibit transactions
costs, Merges argues that this very fact will cause rightsholders to
form Collective Rights Organizations (CROs), private associations
designed to set rules of exchange and serve as vehicles for the
efficient distribution of intellectual property. 167 As Merges puts it,
"[it is the high transaction costs associated with the initial [property]
entitlements that lead the parties to establish the [CRO]-an
organization that then dramatically lowers the costs of exchanging the
rights.' 68 In this manner, market participants would facilitate the
diffusion of technological information without state interference and
without any weakening of the underlying entitlements. Merges
argues that CROs will produce more efficient transactions than
liability regimes because they allow the terms of exchange to be set by
the market participants themselves rather than by public regulators. 69
The latter, he says, are more likely to be sub-optimal and
insufficiently responsive to changing conditions. 170 Thus, in Merges'
opinion, liability rules excessively involve the state in matters better
left to the market, and efficiency is best served through the legal
protection of strong, exclusionary intellectual-property rights.
Merges' theory assumes that the holders of property rights want
to exchange their intellectual property with others; high contracting
costs will not drive rightsholders to form CROs unless they want
contracting to occur. The assumption that rightsholders desire
contracting may be correct in certain contexts, 171 but it is often
incorrect in systems-technology industries. As Intergraph discovered,
traditional transaction costs are not the only potential barrier to
164. See Merges, supra note 75, at 1300.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 1301-27.
167. See id at 1295-97.
168. Id. at 1302-03.
169. See idL at 1307-15.
170. See id.
171. Most of the examples Merges uses involve artistic intellectual property such as
musical rights and movie scripts, see id., products that exhibit none of the characteristics
discussed in Part II and whose creators may indeed wish to maximize their licensed use.
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efficient transactions in these industries. Innovators with
anticompetitive motives will exclude others from their intellectual
property even if such exclusion is not socially desirable. 172 To use
Merges' terminology, even with gains from trade in the intellectual-
property rights, the exercise of market power can impose transaction
costs that CROs may not be able to overcome. Merges essentially
ignores the role of anticompetitive behavior as an impediment to
intellectual-property exchange. 73
(4) Valuation difficulties
A standard objection to liability rules is that they raise valuation
difficulties. 174  Because these rules produce nonconsensual
transactions, they require an external mechanism for assigning values
to property rights. Typically, the external mechanism will be the
judicial system, which will assign values based upon prevailing market
rates. 75 Where those rates are nonexistent or unreliable, however,
another valuation method is necessary.
Merges argues that valuation is acutely difficult in the
intellectual-property context and that this provides a basis for
rejecting liability rules. Without elaborating upon the point, he
asserts that "[in] the intellectual property field... court valuation is
unrealistic.' 176 Presumably this is because markets for individual
intellectual-property rights usually are not thick (if those rights have
been traded at all), and courts lack the expertise to appraise them.
Merges considers legislatures a more realistic mechanism for
assigning values to intellectual-property rights, but he argues that
their valuations are likely to be inaccurate and excessively
172. See supra Part II.A.6 (discussing anticompetitive use of intellectual-property
rights in systems-technology industries); supra note 123 and accompanying text (noting
that compatibility will be underproduced in industries with network externalities).
173. The only hints that such behavior might be a concern are buried in the middle of
the article, where Merges notes that patent pools may facilitate cartels but nonetheless
concludes that the government should encourage their formation. See Merges, supra note
75, at 1340, 1355-58.
174. Calabresi and Melamed recognized these difficulties in their initial elaboration of
the property-rule/liability-rule framework, see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 15, at
1106-10, and they have since been elaborated upon by other scholars, see, e.g., Epstein,
supra note 28, at 2092-94.
175. See, e.g., 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.01[3] (rev. 3d ed. 1997) (stating
that eminent-domain valuation is a power reserved to the judiciary); Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 15, at 1108 (noting that tort systems, in which judges determine
damage awards, are liability regimes). Indeed, most scholarly discussions of liability rules
simply assume that the judiciary will perform valuation. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed,
supra note 15; Kaplow & Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules, supra note 28;
Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 854 n.82 (1993).
176. Merges, supra note 75, at 1308.
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inflexible. 177  He therefore rejects external valuation methods
altogether and concludes that the appraisal of intellectual-property
rights should be left to private parties-that is, property-rule
protections should not be abandoned in favor of liability rules.
What Merges overlooks is that liability rules need not specify the
valuations of intellectual-property rights, only the processes for
making such valuations. Obtaining valuations on an ad hoc basis
through the courts may be unrealistic, and legislative assignment of
specific valuations may be likewise undesirable. But rather than
assign particular values to intellectual-property rights, courts or
legislatures could mandate a process by which rightsholders and those
seeking their technology would have to agree upon access prices.
Arbitration techniques exist that can determine transaction prices
likely to be superior to government-mandated values. Perhaps the
best technique for this purpose would be final-offer arbitration, in
which each party submits a single value to an arbitrator, who must
select between them.78 This form of arbitration has two primary
advantages in this context: it is a mechanical process that forces both
parties' participation, and it can proceed along a fixed, streamlined
timetable without becoming bogged down by stalled negotiations.
Although the final-offer technique does not eliminate the risk of
inefficient valuation, it is far superior to a system in which courts or
legislatures directly mandate values themselves.
Merges also overlooks the fact that, in many access disputes,
independent valuation may not be necessary. In Intergraph, for
instance, Intel had denied technological access to Intergraph but had
granted it to a number of similarly situated manufacturers.17 9 As a
consequence, the court could rely upon market transactions when
appraising the value of access.1 80  Indeed, unless the innovator
attempts to suppress access entirely, it is likely that voluntary market
transactions will be able to inform the valuation process. 81
177. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
17& See generally Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Bargaining with Informative Offers:
An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration, 27 J. LEGAL STuD. 415 (1998). The parties may or
may not be given a brief period to settle after learning of each others' submissions.
179. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255,1267 (N.D. Ala. 1998).
180. See id. at 1291-93.
181. Individual rightsholders may have idiosyncratic valuations that are not reflected in
the market prices of their rights. See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an
Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 562-65
(1977). For discussions of the difficulties in attempting to provide compensation for
idiosyncratic property valuations, see EPSTEIN, supra note 73, at 182-86, 216-18; Jack L.
Knetsch & Thomas E. Borcherding, Expropriation of Private Property and the Basis for
Compensation, 29 U. TORONTO L.J. 237, 237-42 (1979); Merrill, supra note 73, at 82-85.
Even if courts could accurately measure the idiosyncratic valuations that rightsholders
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Furthermore, in cases such as Dell Computer, in which the innovator
engaged in independent improper behavior, 8 2 it may be appropriate
to set the valuation at zero. In either of these situations, it will be
possible to avoid valuation problems entirely.
So again, although valuation issues raise difficulties for liability-
rule regimes, they do not provide a compelling basis for opposing the
adoption of such a regime for systems technology.
C. Inconclusive Factors
At least two potential effects of liability rules cannot currently be
evaluated with any degree of certainty. One is their impact upon
technological standardization. It is not clear whether liability rules
would further entrench existing standards or encourage the
development of competing technologies. 183 It is also not clear
whether the market currently produces optimal, insufficient, or
excessive standardization. 8 4 Until these issues become resolved,
normative evaluations of the impact that liability rules would have on
standardization will be speculative at best.85
The impact that liability rules would have on litigation in
systems-technology industries is likewise indeterminate. Adopting
these rules would eliminate lawsuits in which developers seek to
overcome exclusionary property rights and gain access to a
technology, but several other forms of litigation would probably
become more prominent. For instance, once the factors necessary for
the shift to liability rules had been established, litigation would no
place on their intellectual property, however, it might still be preferable to set
compensation at the market rate. For instance, by withholding access to intellectual
property, a rightsholder may be able to maintain market power and pursue
anticompetitive practices. See discussion supra Subsection III.A.6. This would contribute
to the value the rightsholder places on access to the property, but it would be improper to
provide compensation for the loss of the ability to engage in illegal behavior. In such a
situation, a liability rule based upon a market valuation might be more efficient than one
based upon the rightsholder's subjective valuation. Of course, courts should rely upon
market valuations only when markets are sufficiently thick. Otherwise, these valuations
might not reflect efficient transaction prices, but rather the idiosyncratic preferences of a
few parties. See generally Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65 (1985).
182. Dell Consent Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 57,870 (1995).
183. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
184. See supra Subsection II.A.1. Indeed, there may be no generalized answer to this
matter, as it may vary across technologies.
185. Access to systems technology becomes important and subject to dispute only once
that technology has already become somewhat standardized. When a systems technology
has not become standardized, its owner has a strong incentive to make access to it as open
as possible and thereby increase the likelihood of industry adoption. For this reason,
resolving access disputes with liability rules probably will not affect the creation of
standards. But it may have an impact on the longevity of pre-existing standards.
August 2000] 1117
doubt arise over whether those factors existed in individual cases.
186
Lawsuits might also arise over whether innovators obliged to allow
access to their technologies were in fact doing so adequately. There is
no reliable way of establishing, ex ante, which of these effects would
dominate, and it is therefore difficult to formulate an argument for or
against a liability-rule system based upon its potential effects on
litigation.
D. Conclusions on the Desirability of the Liability-Rule Solution
As a matter of economic policy, the nascent legal trend towards
open-access liability rules for systems technology appears justified.
These rules produce a more efficient level of compatibility than
would otherwise exist, and they prevent firms from using exclusionary
intellectual-property entitlements to achieve anticompetitive ends.
Moreover, no compelling basis exists for objecting to the
implementation of these rules-the strongest possible objections
either contain significant flaws or depend upon issues that have yet to
be resolved.
It is worth noting that the implementation of liability rules would
not impose significant financial burdens on the general public.
Although switching to a liability-rule system might diminish the value
of existing property rights in systems technology, this diminution
would not be a government "taking" that would require
compensation. Under the current doctrine, the adjustment of
property rights should not trigger a compensation obligation,
regardless of whether one approaches the issue by way of analogy to
the real property context' 87 or from a deregulation perspective. 188 As
a consequence, there is no need to fear that a transition to a liability-
rule regime will require large public expenditures.
IV. Doctrinal Foundations for a Liability-Rule Regime
The shift towards liability rules identified in Part I appears
186. Innovators, for example, might contest whether their technology could be
characterized as systems technology. Cf. National Broad. Co. v. Satellite Broad.
Networks, 940 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1991) (analyzing whether satellite television providers
are "cable systems" entitled to benefit from compulsory licensing provisions in the
Copyright Act of 1976); Robert Alan Garrett & Philip R. Hochberg, Sports Broadcasting,
358 PL/PAT 321, 336 n.49, 343-44 (1993) (describing a number of pending suits similar to
National Broadcasting Company).
187. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Compensation and the Interconnectedness of
Property, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 327, 348 (1998) (discussing various theories under which the
government regulation of interconnected property does not constitute a taking).
188. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Takings Clause and Improvident Regulatory
Bargains, 108 YALE LJ. 801 (1999) (exposing the deficiencies in theories of "deregulatory
takings").
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justified as a matter of economic policy, but can it be squared with
prevailing legal doctrine? The question may seem irrelevant, as both
antitrust and intellectual-property laws constantly evolve in response
to changing economic conditions.189 If a doctrine becomes contrary to
the goals of these laws, a change is appropriate regardless of the
doctrine's precedential pedigree. Furthermore, the cases discussed in
Part I themselves provide precedential support for the use of liability
rules in future systems-technology disputes, and no more may be
necessary to satisfy the adjudicators of such disputes. Nonetheless,
critics may argue that these decisions represent a radical departure
from the traditional policy of promoting strong proprietary
entitlements in intellectual property, and they might assert that such
an unprecedented move must be made at the behest of the legislature
and not the courts.19 To guard against such potential criticisms, it is
important to observe that the doctrinal shift under consideration is
not a radical legal change, but rather a logical extension of several
strains of well-established court jurisprudence. Support for the use of
liability rules to promote access to systems technology can be found
in each of the legal doctrines discussed below.
A. Monopolization Doctrine
As the Intergraph district court properly noted, section 2 of the
Sherman Act imposes affirmative duties upon monopolists "to refrain
from acting in a manner that unreasonably harms competition."' 91
Because of these duties, behavior that impedes competition may be
unlawful for a monopolist even if the same behavior would be legal
189. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997) (arguing that stare decisis
is less important in the antitrust context, where considerations of changing business
experience mandate an evolution of the law to keep up with contemporary economic
principles); J.H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy:
Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 475, 477 n.5 (1995) (discussing the international consensus that intellectual-
property law must change to keep pace with changing economic conditions).
190. Cf. David McGowan, Regulating Competition in the Information Age Computer
Software as an Essential Facility Under the Sherman Act, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
771, 835 (1996) ("If Congress wants to allow copyrightholders to preclude any copying at
all ... that is Congress' business.... [A]ntitrust... cannot properly be invoked to tinker
with the parameters of the copyright."). See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 318 (1996) (calling for more "judicial
self-restraint"); J. Clifford Wallace, The Jurisprudence of Judicial Restraint" A Return to
the Moorings, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1981) (arguing that more judicial restraint is
necessary). But see Diana Gribbon Motz, A Federal Judge's View of Richard A. Posner's
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM, 73 NOTRE DAME L REv. 1029,
1029 (1998) (discussing and criticizing the political movement against "judicial activism").
191. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1277 (N.D. Ala. 1998); see also
15 U.S.C. § 2 (Deering's 1994); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
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for a party without monopoly power.192 Furthermore, a few courts
have explicitly held that intellectual-property rights do not confer
antitrust immunity and that a monopolist's exclusionary use of such
rights may constitute a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.193
The Intergraph district court drew upon this doctrinal foundation
in holding that Intel's refusal to license its technology constituted a
misuse of monopoly power under section 2. The court reasoned that
this section prohibits a monopolist from using its power in an
anticompetitive manner, and that Intel had therefore violated the
Sherman Act because its invocation of its property rights had
unreasonably impaired competition.194 Requisite to this holding was
the court's finding that Intel was indeed a monopolist.195 The court
found that Intel controlled over ninety percent of the market for
high-performance microprocessors, 196 that there were no adequate
substitutes for its technology, 197 and that the company was therefore
presumptively a monopolist for section 2 purposes.198
The same reasoning will apply whenever a party holds an
intellectual-property entitlement in systems technology that has
become standardized. Once a standard technology exists, it will by
definition control a vast portion of its market, and exclusion of
competitors from that market, whether through the exercise of
intellectual-property rights or otherwise, will violate the Sherman
Act. None of the reasoning necessary to this argument constitutes a
revolutionary departure from traditional understandings of that Act,
and the result of this reasoning firmly supports the use of liability
rules to protect systems-technology property rights.' 99
192. See, e.g., Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1207 (9th
Cir. 1997) (citing Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM, 559 F.2d 488, 498 (9th Cir. 1977));
Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802,811 (3d Cir. 1984).
193. See Image Technical Servs., 125 F.3d at 1216-19; Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys.
Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147,1187 (1st Cir. 1994).
194. See Intergraph, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1277.
195. See id. at 1275.
196. See i The court also found that Intel possessed monopoly power in the "separate
relevant market" for Intel high-performance microprocessors, but this conclusion was not
necessary to its decision. Id. The Federal Circuit did not revisit either of these findings
because, in its opinion, "Intel's market power in the microprocessor market [was]
irrelevant to the issues of this case." Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1354
(Fed. Circ. 1999).
197. See Intergraph, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1276.
198. See id at 1275-76.
199. At least, it supports the use of such rules once the technology has become
standardized. But as discussed in Sections II.A and III.A.1, systems technology tends to
become standardized fairly quickly, and it is only after such standardization that access
disputes are likely to arise.
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B. Common-Carrier Doctrine
The common-carrier doctrine provides a second foundation for a
liability-rule regime. A common carrier is an entity with control of a
particular service to which there is a public interest in providing
nondiscriminatory access.20° Once an entity has been designated a
common carrier, it must provide its service on reasonable terms and
in an open, unbiased manner. Thus, common carriers are effectively
governed by liability rules; they cannot exclude others from obtaining
their services and from using property dedicated to these services, but
they do have a right to reasonable compensation.201 The concept of
common carriers originated in England, where it originally applied to
innkeepers and other businessmen determined by the courts to have
"held [themselves] out as ready to serve the public by exercising
[their] trade[s]." 2°  Over time, however, jurists have expanded the
concept to encompass such modern service providers as railroads,
20 3
telephone carriers, 2 4 and the administrators of electricity distribution
networks.205 Often, the classification of an entity as a common carrier
has been predicated upon the entity's enjoyment of a grant of de jure
monopoly status or other privilege from the government,2°6 but such a
privilege is neither necessary2°7  nor sufficient 2 8  for such a
classification.
200. See generally Jim Rossi, The Common Law "Duty to Serve" and Protection of
Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1233 (1998); Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and
Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REv. 1283,1307 (1996).
201. See Epstein, supra note 28, at 2118.
202. Singer, supra note 200, at 1307; accord David. S. Bogen, The Innkeeper's Tale: The
Legal Development of a Public Calling, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 51. Seminal cases in the
development of the common-carrier concept include Gibson v. Hurst, 91 Eng. Rep. 220
(K.B. 1710); Lane v. Cotton, 88 Eng. Rep. 1458 (K.B. 1701); and White's Case, 2 Dyer 343
(1586).
203. See, e.g., Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady R.R. Co., 3 Paige Ch. 44 (N.Y. Ch.
1831).
204. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613); Epstein, supra note 28, at 2119-20.
205. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
206. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-31 (Deering's 1994 & Supp. III 1997) (regulating
telephone and telegraph companies as common carriers); Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas Light
Co., 6 Wis. 539, 546-47 (1858) (holding that a gas company has a duty to serve the public
because of its "exclusive privilege" to furnish gas to the surrounding area).
207. See Singer, supra note 200, at 1412-50 (discussing applicability of common-carrier
doctrine to hotels, which receive no monopoly privileges from the government).
208. See 47 U.S.C. § 541(c) (Deering's 1994) (declaring that cable operators are not
common carriers); Robert Kline, Freedom of Speech on the Electronic Village Green:
Applying the Lessons of Cable Television to the Internet, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
23, 30 n.45 (1996) (noting "the practice of local governments to grant monopoly status to
cable operators").
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A strong argument can be made that once a systems technology
becomes standardized, so that its innovator enjoys a de facto
monopoly over public access to a particular computing environment,
that innovator should be considered a common carrier. Like the
owners of railroad lines and electricity networks, those who hold
intellectual-property rights in systems technology control access to a
resource that others need to facilitate their own trade,20 9 and there is
a public interest in allowing this access to be as open and
nondiscriminatory as possible.210 This reasoning leads directly to the
outcome advocated in Part III of this Article: owners of systems-
technology entitlements should receive fair compensation for the use
of their technology and not be able to exclude others from it.
C. Other Possible Doctrinal Foundations
There exist two further possible doctrinal foundations for
liability rules in systems-technology industries: the essential-facility
doctrine and the merger doctrine of copyright law. The former
doctrine is of questionable validity, and the proper scope of the latter
is uncertain. Nonetheless, both doctrines enjoy an established legal
pedigree, and if nothing else, they provide additional precedential
support for the use of liability rules to promote technological access.
Under the essential-facility doctrine, parties can gain access to
property essential for their competitive survival if they can establish
(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist, (2) their inability
to duplicate the facility in a reasonable manner, (3) the monopolist's
denial of the use of the facility, and (4) the feasibility of providing the
facility211  Arguably, access to standardized systems technology
qualifies as an essential facility, as a firm requires this access to
develop its own marketable products, it cannot reasonably replicate
the technology on its own, and the controller of the technology can
209. Admittedly, there is a difference between systems technology and the other
resources traditionally subject to common-carrier requirements, as those seeking access to
systems technology can be competitors, and not just customers, of its owner. The case law
indicates, however, that the presence of competitors among those seeking access should
not affect the calculus. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co., 410 U.S. at 366 (presence of rival
power generators among those seeking access to Otter Tail's distributional network did
not relieve it of its duty to provide open access).
210. See supra Part III.
211. See MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
Recent cases have indicated that there may now be a fifth requirement as well: that the
monopolist be unable to establish a reasonable business justification for restricting access
to the facility. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985)
(appearing to place the burden of establishing such a justification on the alleged
monopolist). See generally PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW [ 736.1-36.2 (1996).
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easily provide the firm with the information necessary for access.212
The essential-facility doctrine, however, is not without its
problems and critics. Several prominent antitrust scholars have
questioned its coherence and utility as a method of promoting
competition. 213 Even if the doctrine is sound in general, it may be
inapplicable to the systems-technology context. The majority of cases
that have established and developed the doctrine involved situations
where duplication of the pertinent facility would have been
inefficient.2 14 Whether it is efficient to develop a systems technology
to compete with a prevailing standard can depend upon whether one
considers a static or a dynamic model. In a static model, the existence
of network externalities may make it efficient for everyone to use the
same standardized technology,215 and access to this technology may
therefore qualify as an essential facility. In a dynamic model,
however, the development and adoption of competing standards can
facilitate efficient transitions to superior technologies, which
strengthens the argument for encouraging the development of these
new standards. As it is unknown whether liability rules will promote
or impede the development of competing standards,216 and as the
optimal pace of technological transition is similarly unknown, it is
impossible to determine as a general rule whether enforcing access to
systems-technology standards would be consistent with the essential-
facility rationale.
The applicability of the merger doctrine to systems-technology
disputes is similarly questionable. Under merger doctrine, an
innovator cannot assert a proprietary copyright over a creation if that
212. Cf. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1278 (N.D. Ala. 1998)
("Reasonable and timely access to critical business information that is necessary to
compete is an essential facility.") (citing BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley
Info. Publ'g., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1551, 1566 (S.D. Fla. 1988), aff'd 933 F.2d 952 (11th Cir.
1991)). But cf. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1356-59 (holding that the
essential facility doctrine does not apply to the Intergraph-Intel dispute).
213. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 59, § 7.7; Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities:
An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990).
214. For instance, two of the most important essential facility cases are United States v.
Terminal Railroad Association, 224 U.S. 383 (1912), and Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). The former concerned access to railroad switching yard
facilities in St. Louis, while the latter concerned access to a large electricity distribution
network. In each case, the presumed inefficiency of constructing a duplicate facility
strengthened the argument for requiring open access to the existing facility. Indeed, at
least one commentator has argued that the essential facility doctrine should be limited to
cases where the facility at issue is a natural monopoly. See McGowan, supra note 190, at
804-05.
215. This will depend upon whether the strength of the externalities outweighs the
virtues of alternative technologies.
216. See supra note 87-88 and accompanying text.
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creation is the only reasonable means of achieving a valuable end.217
Economist Joseph Farrell has proposed that, in markets that exhibit
network externalities and standardization, this doctrine may provide
a basis for weakening intellectual-property rights.218 He suggests that
this doctrine might apply to technology that, though originally
protectable, "becomes a de facto standard and thus becomes the only
commercially reasonable way to compete. '219
As with the essential-facility doctrine, there are several problems
with invoking the merger doctrine as support for a liability-rule
regime for systems technology. First, the scope of this doctrine is
currently in dispute. The Third Circuit has held that the doctrine
applies only if the copyrighted creation is the only way to achieve the
desired end.220 Arguably, this narrow interpretation would permit the
protection of standardized technology, as those seeking access to the
technology could, in theory, create a competing standard or design
their own compatibility interfaces.221 On the other hand, the Second
Circuit has indicated that merger occurs when the copyrighted
creation is merely the most efficient method of achieving the desired
end.222 Under this interpretation, access to standardized technology
would appear not to be protectable, as the use of such access is the
most efficient method of competition for the developers of
complementary products. Other circuit courts have adopted different
formulations of the merger doctrine that lie somewhere between the
narrow construction of the Third Circuit and the broad construction
of the Second Circuit.223 With the scope of the doctrine this unclear,
217. See WILLIAM S. STRONG, THE COPYRIGHT BOOK 12 (3d ed. 1990) (citing
Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967)); cf NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL
REPORT 20 (1979) ("[W]hen specific instructions, even though previously copyrighted, are
the only and essential means of accomplishing a given task, their later use by another will
not amount to infringement."), cited with approval in Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai,
Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708 (2d Cir. 1992). Copyright law typically protects the innovations of
software developers, whereas patent law protects the innovations of hardware developers.
218. See Farrell, supra note 154, at 373.
219. Id
220. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab. Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir.
1986).
221. Of course, it is not hard to imagine situations in which neither of these options
would be realistic. Consider Intergraph's predicament or that of a PC software company
excluded from the Windows operating system.
222. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, 982 F.2d at 708-09.
223. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir. 1993)
(stating that the merger doctrine prevents the granting of exclusive rights to "the only, or
one of only a few, means of expressing [an] idea") (citing Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic
Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606-07 (1st Cir. 1988)); Brown Bag Software v.
Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1476 (9th Cir. 1992) (articulating a slightly different
merger test).
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its utility as a foundation for open-access liability rules is open to
question. Furthermore, the merger doctrine suggests that the proper
approach would be to eliminate intellectual-property entitlements in
standardized systems technology entirely, not merely to weaken their
enforcement mechanisms.
But regardless of the merit and applicability of the essential-
facility and merger doctrines, both rest on a central premise that has
become ensconced in the law: exclusion from a resource necessary
for competitive survival can be anticompetitive and therefore illegal.
This premise is consistent with and supportive of the use of liability
rules in cases in which fully exclusionary intellectual-property rights
would stymie competition and innovation. Despite their problems,
the two doctrines therefore provide further precedential support for
the use of liability rules to protect systems-technology entitlements.
These doctrines, together with the monopolization doctrine and the
common-carrier doctrine, establish that the shift identified in Part I is
not a radical departure from established legal theory. Rather, it
furthers a general policy against anticompetitive exclusion that has
long existed in the laws that regulate economic behavior. Indeed, this
policy appears so well grounded in the law that a failure to adhere to
it in the systems-technology context would in fact be something of a
departure.
V. Case Study: United States v. Microsoft
The current legal dispute between the United States and
Microsoft is, like Intergraph and Dell Computer, a dispute about the
scope of intellectual-property rights in systems technology and the
constraints that antitrust concerns place upon their use.224 The
dispute is rich with novel elements and sources of legal controversy,
and analyzing these has become something of a cottage industry for
jurists and economists alike.225 The purpose of this Part is neither to
provide a comprehensive analysis of the dispute nor to retrace ground
that has already been covered in the burgeoning academic literature
on the subject. Rather, the discussion below will focus on a single
aspect of the Microsoft case-the dispute over the company's
224. See Amended Complaint, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20897.
225. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gifford, Microsoft Corporation, the Justice Department, and
Antitrust Theory, 25 Sw. U. L. REV. 621 (1996); Norman W. Hawker, Consistently Wrong:
The Single Product Issue and the Tying Claims Against Microsoft, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 1
(1998); Michael P. Kenny & William H. Jordan, United States v. Microsoft: Into the
Antitrust Regulatory Vacuum Missteps the Department of Justice, 47 EMORY L.J. 1351
(1998); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Remedy or Monopoly Leveraging by
Electronic Networks, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1998).
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management of the Windows desktop-and examine it in light of the
theories set forth in Parts I-IV.
One of the charges against Microsoft is that it "has misused, and
continues to misuse, its Windows operating system monopoly by
requiring PC OEMs [Original Equipment Manufacturers] to agree...
to adopt the uniform 'boot-up' sequence and 'desktop' screen
specified by Microsoft. '226 The essence of the claim is that Microsoft
has used its control of the initial desktop settings to promote its own
Internet browser software, Internet Explorer, and to exclude those of
other developers. Microsoft requires computer manufacturers to
retain Internet Explorer on the Microsoft desktop and prohibits them
from adding other browsing software to the desktop.227 According to
the Justice Department:
As a result of Microsoft's restrictive boot-up and desktop screen
agreements, OEMs are deprived of the freedom to make
competitive choices about which browser or other software product
should be offered to their customers, the ability to determine for
themselves the design and configuration of the initial screens
displayed on the computers they sell, and the ability to differentiate
their products to serve their perceptions of consumers' needs.
As a result, these restrictions further exclude competing Internet
browsers from the most important channels of distribution,
substantially reduce OEMs' incentives and abilities to innovate and
differentiate their products in ways that could facilitate competition
between Microsoft products and competing software products, and
enhance Microsoft's ability to use the near-ubiquity of its Windows
operating system monopoly to gain dominance in both the Internet
browser market and other software markets.228
According to Microsoft, however, its proprietary intellectual-property
rights in its operating system allow it to place whatever restrictions it
pleases on the appearance of its desktop.229
The computer desktop serves as the user interface for the
operating system, and it therefore qualifies as a component of systems
226. See Amended Complaint at 8, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20897 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 1999). The district court found in favor of the government
on this charge. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 39-42 (D.D.C.
1999).
227. See Amended Complaint at 8-9, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20897, at *8-9, (Dec. 20, 1999); see also Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 39-42
(essentially adopting these allegations as findings); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F.
Supp. 2d 9,49-54 (D.D.C. 1999).
228. Amended Complaint at 9, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20897.
229. See, e.g., Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 40-41 (rejecting this argument); Steve Lohr,
U.S. Presents Documents in Case Against Microsoft, N.Y. TiMES, January 21,1999, at C1.
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technology. As stated in the Microsoft complaint, "the Windows
desktop screen is the screen through which most PC users access
application programs and the other functionality on their PCs." 30
The desktop frames the computing environment within which users
operate other programs and from which they connect to external
products and other users. The government alleges that Microsoft's
exclusion of rival browsing software from its desktop stifles
competition and innovation,231 whereas Microsoft alleges that such
exclusion is a permissible exercise of its intellectual-property rights-
a paradigmatic access dispute over systems technology.
One proposed solution is to compel Microsoft to allow the
browser software of its competitors, particularly Netscape, equal
access to its desktop.232 This proposal has some merit, but it lacks a
limiting criterion. How viable must a browser be to deserve access to
the desktop? Must Microsoft grant such access to every functional
browser on the market? Furthermore, it is not unreasonable for
Microsoft to argue that it should not be forced to use its own
technology as a vehicle for its competitors' programs without any
control or compensation.2 33
A better solution would be the liability-rule approach explored
in this Article. Under this approach, developers of rival web
browsers could buy their way onto the Microsoft desktop. Microsoft
230. Amended Complaint at 32, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20897.
231. See id. at 47. This exclusion can also be conceptualized as exclusion from equal
access to the operating system itself.
232. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2, United
States v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV.A.98-1232 (D.D.C. filed May 18, 1998) (seeking
injunction to force Microsoft to include Netscape browsing software on the initial
Windows desktop); Steve Lohr & Joel Brinkley, Antitrust Talks Founder on Microsoft's
"Desktop", N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1998, at A4. The district court largely adopted this
proposal as part of its remedial decree. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp.
2d 59, 66-67 (D.D.C. 2000) ("Microsoft shall not restrict... an OEM from modifying the
boot sequence, startup folder, internet connection wizard, desktop, preferences, favorites,
start page, first screen, or other aspect of a Windows Operating System Product to (1)
include a registration sequence to obtain subscription or other information from the user;
(2) display icons of or otherwise feature other products or services, regardless of the size
or shape of such icons or features, or to remove the icons, folders, start menu entries, or
favorites of Microsoft products or services; (3) display any user interfaces, provided that
an icon is also displayed that allows the user to access the Windows user interface; or (4)
launch automatically any non-Microsoft Middleware, Operating System or application,
offer its own Internet access provider or other start-up sequence, or offer an option to
make non-Microsoft Middleware the Default Middleware and to remove the means of
End-User Access for Microsoft's Middleware Product.").
233. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, U.S., 20 States Sue Microsoft, Allege Abuses, WASH.
POST, May 19, 1998, at A01 ("[Microsoft Chairman Bill] Gates said government demands
to include Netscape software in Windows is like 'requiring Coca-Cola to include three
cans of Pepsi in every six-pack it sells."'); Lohr & Brinkley, supra note 232, at Al.
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could not deny them access, but they would be required to pay for
this access at a reasonable rate. Determining the proper rate would
be more difficult here than in Intergraph because Microsoft has not
previously sold this type of access and has no interest in selling it. It
may be, depending on the ultimate outcome of other portions of the
case, that compensation could be set at zero, as was done in Dell
Computer, due to Microsoft's history of anticompetitive behavior in
the browser and operating-system markets. If not, this would be an
appropriate situation in which to mandate an expedient arbitration
procedure to resolve the pricing issueP 4 Either way, Microsoft would
be able to profit from the use of its standardized systems technology,
the innovation and competition of other software firms would not be
constrained, and the net result would presumably be a marked
increase in social welfare.
The principle at work here is not limited to browser software.
Because the Windows operating system is the industry standard,
Microsoft should not be able to deny adequate access to any
manufacturer of a complementary product willing to pay reasonable
compensation, regardless of whether the product is a web browser, a
word processor, or any other form of technology. For instance, if
Microsoft designed its desktop to give Microsoft Word a substantial
advantage over Corel WordPerfect or to give Microsoft Excel a
substantial advantage over Lotus 1-2-3, analogous competitive
concerns would arise. This is not to say that Microsoft must take
affirmative steps to make its operating system compatible with the
technology of others, nor is it to say that other technology must have
precisely the same level of access as Microsoft technology23~5 The
appropriate standard, as discussed in Part I, is that Microsoft should
not be able to use its systems-technology rights to deny other
innovators the ability to develop commercially viable compatible
products23 6
234. See supra Subsection III.B.4; see also Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1999)
(establishing a variety of institutional arrangements for determining wheeling prices in the
event that private access negotiations break down).
235. The Justice Department's case against Microsoft, for example, is predicated on the
theory that denying Netscape access to the Microsoft desktop "materially disadvantaged"
that company's ability to compete on the Windows platform. See Amended Complaint at
50, United States v. Microsoft, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20897 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 1999).
Microsoft may presumably favor its own technology on its desktop and in its operating
system to some extent. It simply cannot do so in ways that substantially impair the
commercial viability of its rivals.
236. See discussion supra Subsection I.B.4.
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Conclusion
There is an emerging doctrinal shift in the laws that govern
economic competition, a movement towards the use of liability rules
to protect intellectual-property rights in systems technology. In one
respect, this legal development is revolutionary, as it represents a
movement away from the strong, exclusionary entitlements that the
law has traditionally granted to intellectual-property developers. In
other respects, however, this development is not revolutionary at all.
Rather, it is a foreseeable response to the new forms of intellectual
property that have recently arisen-a response that is entirely
consistent with, and perhaps even required by, an anti-exclusionary
principle that has permeated property and antitrust laws since their
inception. Carrying this principle into the systems-technology context
advances the goals of robust innovation and efficient economic
behavior that underlie these laws, and indeed, the net effect of
liability rules in this context will probably be to increase social
welfare.
The trend that has begun with the cases of Intergraph and Dell
Computer should continue. Courts and other regulators that preside
over technological access disputes should be alert to the existence of
systems technology and to the way its characteristics affect legal and
economic analysis.237 They should resist the arguments of innovators
who claim the absolute right to control the disposition and use of
their technology. Such arguments appeal to a conception of
intellectual property that has become ingrained in the legal culture
and the popular mind, but the same competitive concerns that fuel
antitrust doctrine form the parameters of the regulatory system of
which intellectual-property law is a part. To permit intellectual-
property rights to trump these concerns would be to place the cart
before the horse-and to do so at the expense of the public good.
237. When uncertain as to whether a particular technology qualifies as systems
technology, these regulators should consider whether it possesses the characteristics
emphasized in the foregoing discussion: network externalities, interconnectivity, rapid
innovation, and excludability.
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